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I. Introduction
New Year's Eve, 2003. Genarlow Wilson, a seventeen year old
high school senior, and several classmates, gathered at a local hotel in
Douglasville, Georgia to ring in the New Year. After engaging in oral sex
with a fifteen year-old girl that evening,2 Wilson was later charged with
aggravated child molestation, though both asserted that it was consensual.4
He refused to plead guilty, and at trial was convicted and sentenced to the
mandatory minimum of ten years in prison without the possibility of
parole.5 Upon his eventual release, Wilson would be subject to a host of
1. Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). For a full recounting of the
Genarlow Wilson story, see Wendy S. Cash, A Search for 'Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation' in Wilson
v. State, 42 NEw ENG. L. REV. 225 (2007) and Chandra R. Thomas, Why Is Genarlow Wilson in
Prison?, ATLANTA MAG., January 2006, at 64-69, 144, 146, 148.
2. See Cash, supra note 1, at 227.
3. Wright Thompson, Outrageous Injustice, ESPN, Jan. 24, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=Wilson.
4. Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 393 n.9 ("The state [of Georgia] disputes the accuracy of Wilson's
characterization of the sexual activity between himself and T.C. as 'consensual' or 'voluntary,' because
it has been held that children do not have the capacity to give consent to or to resist a sexual act directed
at them."); see also Michael Kent Curtis & Shannon Gilreath, Transforming Teenagers into Oral Sex
Felons: The Persistence of the Crime Against Nature After Lawrence v. Texas, 43 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 155 (2008); Jeremy Redmon, Girl's Mother Defends Wilson, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 14, 2007,
at Al.
5. Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 392; see also Cash, supra note 1, at 227.
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"civil disabilities,"6 most notably a lifetime registration requirement as a
convicted sex offender. Dissatisfied with the trial outcome, Wilson
appealed, arguing that the significant sentence disparity under then-Georgia
law between statutory rape and aggravated child molestation violated the
Equal Protection Clause.8 He further argued that existing Georgia child
protection laws created doubt as to whether the legislature intended any
"consensual" sexual activity between teenagers aged fourteen to seventeen
to be treated as a felony, so that the rule of lenity required imposition of the
misdemeanor punishment.9
In the meantime, the case became a cause c616bre.' 0 The district
attorney was accused of abusing his prosecutorial discretion for charging
Wilson with aggravated child molestation and for taking a hard line in the
plea negotiations." But, it was the statutory inconsistency in the sexual
crimes statute that created the problem.12 At the time, an adolescent under
the age of eighteen who engaged in sexual intercourse with another under
the age of sixteen could be charged with statutory rape, a misdemeanor that
carried a maximum one-year sentence.' 3  That same adolescent, however,
who committed an act of sodomy, such as oral sex, could be charged with
aggravated child molestation, a felony that carried a mandatory minimum
ten-year sentence. 14 Several legislators that had passed the aggravated child
molestation statute acknowledged that their intent was not to ensnare
adolescents engaging in consensual sexual activity. The purpose of the
6. See generally Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L & POL. 159 (2001); Nora V.
Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000); Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of
Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 65 (2003); S. David Mitchell, Undermining Individual and
Collective Citizenship: The Impact of Exclusion Laws on the African-American Community, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 833 (2007); Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26
CRIME & JUST. 479 (1999); Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the
Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993); Special Project, The Collateral
Consequences ofa Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970).
7. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2009).
8. See Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 392-93.
9. Id. The rule of lenity is inapplicable to Genarlow because he, unlike Marcus Dixon, another
teen charged with aggravated child molestation, was not convicted of another sexual crime along with
his aggravated child molestation conviction. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The rule of
lenity applies when the same conduct satisfies two statutes with inconsistent penalties, requiring the
lesser penalty to be applied. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (discussing
the rule of lenity).
10. For a brief selection of the extensive press coverage of the Wilson case, see, for example,
Rhonda Cook, Genarlow Wilson: Poll: Cut Prison Time, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 28, 2007, at Bl;
Wendy Koch, States Ease Laws That Punish Teens for Sex With Underage Partners, USA TODAY, July
25, 2007, at IA; Mat Towery, Editorial, Justice: Not a Mirror of Genarlow Wilson's Case, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Oct. 16, 2007, at All.
I1. Jonathan Turley, Over-eager Prosecutors, FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE, June 28, 2007, at 9A.
12. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 146 ("McDade says that he agrees that consensual teenage sex,
including oral sex, does not necessarily warrant a decade-long prison sentence, but he insists that there
were no other options to consider in this case as long as that law remains on the books. ").
13. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-3(a), (c) (1997).
14. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-4(d)(1) (1997).
2009] 3
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statute was to apprehend adult pedophiles preying on children. These
legislators called for Wilson's release.' 5 While Wilson's appeal was
pending, however, the Georgia Legislature amended the statute. Heeding
an earlier recommendation of the Georgia Supreme Court,16 the Georgia
Legislature inserted what is commonly referred to as a "Romeo and Juliet"
provision' 7 in the aggravated child molestation statute to reflect what the
legislature, and society, viewed as the proper degree of culpability for such
adolescent conduct.
With this new provision (hereinafter referred to as the "2006
Amendment"), a defendant, eighteen years old or younger, convicted of
aggravated child molestation based upon an act of sodomy's with a victim
at least thirteen years of age, but not older than sixteen, would now be
found guilty of a misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of one year and
would no longer have to register as a sex offender upon release.19 Wilson's
conduct fell clearly within the ambit of the 2006 Amendment, but the
Georgia Legislature decided not to apply the changes, which can be
classified as ameliorative, 20 retroactively to Wilson or anyone else21 who
15. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 67 (noting the statement of State Representative Tyrone Brooks,
the author of the aggravated child molestation statute, that "the law was intended to protect children
from adult sexual predators, not to police teenage sex"); see also Steve Visser, Law's Creator Wants
Wilson Freed, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 4, 2007, at D3; Rep. Clarke Calls for Immediate Release of
Genarlow Wilson, U.S. FED. NEWS SERV., June 14, 2007, available at
http://clarke.house.gov/2007/06/061407.shtml.
16. Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147, 150-51 (Ga. 2004) ("We encourage the legislature [to] make a
more recognizable distinction between statutory rape, child molestation, and the other sexual crimes, and
to clarify the sort of conduct that will qualify for the ten-year minimum sentence accompanying a
conviction for aggravated child molestation."). For an in-depth discussion of the Marcus Dixon case
and the inconsistency of the Georgia statutes, see Suzanne Smith Williams, Note & Comment, Can't Do
the Time, Don't Do the Crime?: Dixon v. State, Statutory Construction, and the Harsh Realities of
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing in Georgia, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 519, 522-24 (2005).
17. "Romeo and Juliet" clauses are named for the two star-crossed adolescent paramours in
William Shakespeare's play of the same name. See Byron Williams, The Incarceration of Marcus
Dixon, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?ItemlD=16557 (explaining Romeo
and Juliet laws as decriminalizing the behavior or minimizing the offense to misdemeanor status for
consensual teenage relations). But see Cash, supra note 1, at 240 (citing Rep. Towery who stated that he
was unable to get support for such a provision initially with respect to the "age of consent laws").
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)(1) (2009) ("A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or
she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another.").
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(d)(2)(A-C) (2009).
20. This change in Georgia law can best be characterized as a reclassification of conduct with a
sentence reduction. See infra Part III.A (discussing the various types of amelioration).
21. See H.R. 1059 § 30(c), 152nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (providing that the
provisions of the amendments do not affect the status of a crime that occurred before the Act's effective
date). There is a question as to whether the Georgia Legislature was prohibited from applying the
ameliorative changes retroactively because of Georgia's general saving statute. See infra Part ll.B.2
(discussing the effect of a general saving statute). Georgia furthermore has a constitutional retroactive
clause, which also suggests that legislative changes are denied retroactivity. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, Para.
X ("No ... retroactive law ... shall be passed."). However, a minority of jurisdictions has routinely
given retroactive effect to ameliorative changes despite the existence of a general saving statute. See
infra Part V.A. Furthermore, the use of the constitutional retroactive clause to prevent such changes has
been applied mostly in the civil law context. See Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6
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may have been similarly situated.2 2 Wilson eventually secured his release
through the Georgia Supreme Court, which held that the mandatory
minimum ten-year sentence for aggravated child molestation was cruel and
unusual punishment in light of the magnitude of the change in the penalty in
the 2006 Amendment.2 3
On its face, the decision of the Georgia Legislature to deny the
retroactive application of the 2006 Amendment appears as if it were either
an abuse of legislative discretion or constitutionally infirm, especially given
the substantial change in punishment and the judicial statements that
retaining the original penalty violated the Eighth Amendment. 24 However,
neither is true of this case under current law. The action of the Georgia
Legislature, as well as those of other legislative bodies that elect not to
apply ameliorative legislative changes retroactively, are in accord with the
principles governing statutory retroactivity. Under the concept of statutory
retroactivity, statutes are presumed, generally, to operate prospectively only
(i.e. against conduct that took place after the effective date of the statute or
amendment).2 5 There are, however, certain circumstances, such as an
ameliorative change, where statutory retroactivity is permissible.26 The
Georgia courts therefore could have relied upon the changes to the
aggravated child molestation, which were ameliorative, to rebut the
presumption against statutory retroactivity.27 The courts were precluded
from doing so because the Georgia Legislature inserted an express saving
clause 2 8 in the 2006 Amendment, thus preventing its retroactive application.
TEX. L. REv. 409, 414 (1928) ("[R]etrospective lawmaking will perhaps be found not necessarily to be
such [a] gross abuse of legislative power as has been assumed. That this is so is strongly suggested by
the great variety of such laws that are sustained by the courts, even in jurisdictions whose constitutions
expressly forbid retroactive legislation.") [hereinafter Smith II]; see also infra Appendix II (listing other
jurisdictions with constitutional retroactive clauses).
22. The Court has stated that Equal Protection does not require the retroactive application of a
decision that impacts constitutional rights for a defendant. Ronald Elliot Metter, Partial Retroactivity: A
Question ofEqual Protection, 43 TEMP. L. Q. 239, 243 (1970).
23. Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 502 (Ga. 2007) ("[T]he habeas court properly ruled
that Wilson's sentence often years in prison for having consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old girl
when he was only seventeen years old constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, but erred in convicting
and sentencing Wilson for a misdemeanor crime that did not exist when the conduct in question
occurred . . . [T]his case must be remanded to the habeas court for ... an order reversing Wilson's
conviction and sentence and discharging him from custody.").
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, Para. XVII (prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishment).
25. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 415 (1999) ("[Ilt is a well-settled and fundamental rule of statutory
construction that unless it is expressly stated, statutes should not be construed so as to be retroactive, but
should be construed prospectively, from their effective date."); see also 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41:4 (Norman J. Singer ed., 6th ed. 2002).
26. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 41:4 (noting that there are three circumstances where statutory
retroactivity is warranted: (1) the legislative intent, expressly or impliedly, indicates its desirability; (2)
the statutory change is ameliorative or curative; or (3) the "reasonable expectations" of the parties
require it.); see also infra Part IV.
27. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1994) (outlining circumstances that can
defeat the presumption against statutory retroactivity).
28. 2006 Ga. Laws 30; see also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 431 (1999) ("A saving clause or general saving
2009] 5
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While the express saving clause prohibited the retroactivity of the 2006
Amendment, it also prevented the operation of the common-law doctrine of
abatement,29 which was its original, intended purpose.
Under the abatement doctrine, following a legislative repeal, 30 repeal
and reenactment, or amendment of a statute, all pending prosecutions3 are
terminated in the absence of an express contrary legislative intent. 32  To
demonstrate that intent, a legislative body will rely upon an express saving
clause and its progeny-the general saving statute33 or the constitutional
statute preserves rights and liabilities which have accrued under an act repealed."). For an in-depth
discussion of the express saving clause along with the general saving statute, see infra Part IV.A.
29. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the common law doctrine of abatement). The earliest
statements of the common-law doctrine of abatement are attributed to the seventeenth-century jurist
Matthew Hale and the eighteenth-century serjeant-at-law William Hawkins. According to Hale:
"[W]hen an offense is made treason or felony by an act of parliament, and then those acts are repealed,
the offenses committed before such repeal, and the proceedings thereupon are discharged by such repeal,
and cannot be proceeded upon after such a repeal, unless a special clause in the act of repeal be made
enabling such proceeding after the repeal, for offenses committed before the repeal." 1 MATTHEW HALE,
HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 291 (George Wilson
ed., 1778); see also 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 169 (6th ed. 1787).
For a general discussion of the history and modem application of the abatement doctrine, see John P.
MacKenzie, Comment, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and the Federal Savings Statute, 54 GEO. L. J. 173
(1965); Note, Effect of Repeal of a Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions for Prior Acts, 24 IOWA L. REV.
744 (1939). But see Timothy Razel, Dying To Get Away With It: How the Abatement Doctrine Thwarts
Justice-and What Should be Done Instead, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2193, 2196 (2007) (discussing the
application of the abatement doctrine that occurs upon the death of a defendant).
30. Comment, Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative
Criminal Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 120, 121-27 (1972) ("[Repeals] ... historically include[d] the
situation of repeal and re-enactment with different penalties[.]") [hereinafter Today's Law and
Yesterday's Crime]. I will use the term "repeal" when referring to an "abrogation of an existing law by
legislative act," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (8th ed. 2004), and the phrase "repeal and
reenactment" or "amendment" when referring to a statute that has undergone substantial substantive
changes but has not been deleted from the criminal code entirely.
31. See Wall v. State, 18 Tex. 682 (Tex. 1857). The abatement doctrine also terminates civil
proceedings following a legislative change and prior to final judgment, but courts have been less
inclined to give effect to the abatement doctrine out of a particular concern for protecting accrued vested
rights. See Carl Seeman, Jr., The Retroactive Effect of Repeal Legislation, 27 KY. L. J. 75, 93 (1938)
("The more conservative the court, the more likely will it feel that the rights involved (particularly
property rights) should not be divested because it would be unreasonable or unfair or against elementary
principles of justice to do so, and thus the court will be more likely to declare the right unalterable by
legislative action--or vested.").
32. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Pending criminal
prosecutions would abate, unless there was a savings clause in the new legislation, whether the
legislation was an outright repeal or merely an amendment or reenactment of the substantive crime,
since any such revision effectively repealed the statute underlying the prosecution."); State v. Allen, 44
P. 121, 122 (Wash. 1896). But cf People v. Alexander, 224 Cal. Rptr. 290, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
("[W]e conclude that where . . . it is obvious that the Legislature inadvertently deleted the sanctions ...
because of a drafting error, such a 'repeal' cannot and does not reflect an intent to pardon illegal sales
that were committed prior to the error . . . . [W]e hold that under such circumstances, the rule of
abatement is inapplicable."); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 431 (1999) ("It is not essential that there be an express
saving clause in order to save rights under a repealed statute, if an intent to that effect sufficiently
appears by legislative provision at the session of the legislature effecting the repeal.").
33. See Millard H. Ruud, The Savings Clause-Some Problems in Construction and Drafting, 33
TEX. L. REv. 285, 292-93 (1955) ("A savings clause may be general.... The general savings statute, in
turn, is generally a part of a general interpretation act"); see also infra Part IV.
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saving clause,34 or some combination of the three. The purpose of the
saving clause is to prohibit the termination of previously commenced
prosecutions and to retain the punishment in the original statute, particularly
following a statutory amendment in which the penalty is increased and thus
constitutionally barred. Over time, the saving clause has been used,
however, to retain the prior, original penalty even though the legislative
change decreased the penalty, which would not be barred but would result
in a group of defendants serving sentences that, under the newly amended
law, they would not have had to serve. Although the use of the saving
clause to retain a more severe penalty in light of an ameliorative change-
for example, the denial of retroactive amelioration-may be neither an
abuse of discretion nor constitutionally infirm, it is inconsistent with
traditional theories of punishment 5 and thus fails to achieve legitimate
goals of deterrence and retribution. This Article proposes a retroactive
amelioration statute37 that broadens the scope of amelioration beyond pre-
final judgment defendants 38  to include defendants with finalized
convictions, or post-final judgment defendants. The broadening of
retroactive amelioration makes the proposed statute consistent with the
theories of punishment and promotes legitimate goals of punishment.39
Presently, a minority of jurisdictions, uncomfortable with denying
ameliorative changes, practice judicial or legislative retroactive
34. Ruud, supra note 33, at 293 n.38. Four jurisdictions had constitutional saving clauses, but
following the 1968 repeal and reenactment of its constitution, Florida neglected to include one in its new
constitution. N.M. CONST. art. IV, §§ 33-34; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 54; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXII, §§ I-
2 (applies only to the transition of Arizona from a territory into a state).
35. See infra Part II.A. For a general discussion of different theories of punishment, see STANLEY
E. GRUPP, THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (1972); Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-
punishment.
36. See generally Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 949 (1966); W. Peter Doren, Ill, Criminal Law-Retrospective Application of Statute Reducing
Penalty, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1157 (1972); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
37. See infra Part III and Appendix I.
38. The use of final judgment as a line to determine whether a defendant should benefit from an
ameliorative change creates a temporal divide between defendants charged with the same offense. It is
defined differently across jurisdictions. Generally, the line of when a prosecution becomes final is
drawn at the conclusion of an individual's direct appeals. Collateral review is a judicial action that
occurs after final judgment. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); Yeaton v. United States, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 281 (1809) (discussing in admiralty cases that an appeal suspends the sentence until the
appellate court has rendered its decision); Doren, supra note 36, at 1157 (citing Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d
791 (Utah 1971), aff'd on reh'g, 483 P.2d 425 (Utah 1971)). In some jurisdictions, final judgment is
realized after sentencing has occurred. See, e.g., People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 203 (N.Y. 1956). In
still others, it is achieved when the highest court available has heard and made a decision. See, e.g., State
v. Macarelli, 375 A.2d 944, 946 (R.I. 1977). The interests ofjustice would be best served if there was a
singular conceptualization of when a conviction becomes final, but that discussion is beyond the scope
of this Article.
39. But see Vicory v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1380, 1382-83 (Ind. 1980) ("The adoption of a new
system as a better means of serving the constitutional purpose of our penal system does not mean that
prior law did not serve that purpose. [T]he application of prior law to those who committed crimes and
were convicted and sentenced under that prior law does not constitute vindictive justice.").
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amelioration. State courts 40 that practice judicial retroactive amelioration
provide a number of reasons to justify their decisions to give retroactive
effect to such changes despite the existence of general saving statutes in
their jurisdictions. For example, some of these courts state that the denial
of retroactive amelioration is contrary to theories of punishment.4 1 Others
rely upon rules of statutory construction to permit retroactive amelioration
or find the language of the general saving statute to be ambiguous, thus
giving the court license to not adhere to it.4 2 And still others hold that the
saving clause is meant to prevent technical abatement only, and thus should
not be used to thwart retroactive amelioration.4 3 With the proposed statute,
state courts no longer have the onus of creating a reason to justify the
retroactive application of ameliorative legislative changes.
Federal courts, on the other hand, do not acknowledge that they
engage in retroactive amelioration, but their actions suggest otherwise. For
example, the Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the federal
general saving statute: the passage of a constitutional amendment or the
recognition of an affirmative right.44 When a constitutional amendment is
passed, federal courts have held that allowing the federal general savings
clause to prevent the amendment's application would improperly elevate
legislative authority over the expressed will of the people. 45 Thus, courts
have allowed retroactive application of such amendments, particularly when
formerly proscribed conduct has been decriminalized.46 Under the other
exception, courts have chosen to disregard the federal general saving statute
when an affirmative right, that is contrary to existing law, is recognized.4 7
In both circumstances, courts have readily applied the ameliorative change
retroactively, even though the federal general saving statute would suggest
that the changes be prohibited. Unlike the courts, legislatures have elected
a different approach to giving retroactive effect to ameliorative statutory
changes.
When a legislature engages in legislative retroactive amelioration, it
attaches an ameliorative amendment exception 48 to the general saving
40. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (summarizing various state
courts' reasoning for applying ameliorative changes retroactively as well as federal courts' reasoning for
denying retroactive amelioration). See infra Part V.A.
41. See infra Part V.A.I.
42. See infra Part V.A.2.
43. See infra Part V.A.3.
44. 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2006); see Holiday, 683 A.2d at 80 (discussing the exceptions to the federal
general saving statute that have been permitted); see also infra Part V.A..
45. See, e.g., Holiday, 683 A.2d at 80.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. An ameliorative amendment exception is a part of a general saving statute and allows a
reduced penalty in the amended statute to be applied retroactively automatically. An example of an
ameliorative amendment exception can be found in the Vermont criminal code and reads: "If the penalty
or punishment for any offense is reduced by the amendment of an act or statutory provision, the same
shall be imposed in accordance with the act or provision as amended unless imposed prior to the date of
8 [Vol. 37:1
HeinOnline  -- 37 Am. J. Crim. L. 8 2009-2010
In With the New, Out With the Old
statutes to give retroactive effect to ameliorative sentencing changes, thus
the legislature is able to accomplish the dual goal of preventing abatement
and giving automatic retroactive effect to an ameliorative change. The
problem that legislatures encounter is that there is no singular conception of
what constitutes amelioration, thus leaving courts without guidance as to
which changes are to be given effect. Although both forms of retroactive
amelioration succeed in giving effect to ameliorative changes, they are
limited in scope to circumstances where there is no express saving clause in
the new or amended statute and the case has not become final. 4 9 Because of
these restrictions, even these jurisdictions that are favorably disposed to
retroactive amelioration deny an entire class of defendants the opportunity
to have its sentences ameliorated. This Article therefore proposes a
retroactive amelioration statute that not only broadens the scope of
retroactive amelioration to include post-final judgment defendants but also
adopts the legislative retroactive amelioration approach of attaching an
ameliorative amendment exception to a general saving provision.
The proposed retroactive amelioration statute has a post-final
judgment provision that permits defendants with finalized convictions to
request either an expedited parole review or an administrative sentencing
hearing (for jurisdictions without discretionary parole boards50) following
an ameliorative legislative change. This provision expands the pool of
defendants eligible to have an ameliorative sentencing change applied.
With this provision, no longer is the timing of the passage of an
ameliorative legislative change determinative of who is to be eligible for
such changes. Not only do benefits inure to post-final judgment defendants
with a sentence reduction, but also society benefits in the reduction of
incarceration costs.5 1  The placement of the post-final judgment process
under the auspices of the executive branch is done purposefully. It leaves
final judicial decisions undisturbed, avoids any potential separation of
powers conflict, and does not impinge upon the executive's ameliorative
power-the pardon. In addition to broadening the scope of retroactive
amelioration, the proposed statute also incorporates the existing practice of
legislative retroactive in the minority of jurisdictions.
The proposed retroactive amelioration statute contains a general
the amendment." VT. STAT ANN. tit. I § 214(c) (2009) (emphasis added). See infra Appendix II for
additional jurisdictions with ameliorative amendment exceptions to their general saving statutes.
Although jurisdictions similar to Vermont allow for an ameliorative change to be applied retroactively,
the change is restricted to pre-final judgment defendants.
49. Similar to the inapplicability of the abatement doctrine for finalized convictions, see Effect of
Repeal of a Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions for Prior Acts, supra note 29, at 746 ("If the case has
been carried to final conclusion either because of an affirmance upon appeal or because no appeal was
taken, the repeal has no effect."). Ameliorative changes are also restricted.
50. As of 2002, sixteen jurisdictions had abolished "discretionary parole" with another five
abolishing such parole for violent offenses. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME:
PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 65-68 (2003).
51. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001 (discussing the cost
of incarceration).
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saving clause with an ameliorative amendment exception. 52  Under the
proposed statute, retroactive amelioration is given automatic effect and
abatement is prevented from being triggered, thereby negating the necessity
of the express saving clause. Jurisdictions should therefore cease using the
express saving clause which only serves to prevent retroactive amelioration,
which was not the original intent of such clauses. Moreover, by adopting
this proposed statute, it is no longer necessary for state courts53 that want to
apply ameliorative changes retroactively to ignore the jurisdiction's general
saving statute thereby increasing the uniformity in how retroactive
amelioration is practiced within jurisdictions.
Part II discusses the traditional theories of punishment and why the
denial of retroactive amelioration is at odds with those theories. In Part
III, I present a proposal for a retroactive amelioration statute that expands
the scope of retroactive amelioration to include defendants with finalized
convictions and calls for jurisdictions to cease using the express saving
clause. In Part IV, the principles of statutory retroactivity are discussed
along with the circumstances in which retroactivity is permissible, as well
as the intended purpose of the saving clause and its issue in preventing
statutory retroactivity. And in Part V, the current judicial, both state and
federal, and legislative retroactive amelioration practices are provided.
II. Denying Retroactive Amelioration Inflicts Unjustified Punishment
A. Theories of Punishment
Traditionally, the legitimate goals of punishment are classified as
consequentialist 54 and retributivist.55  For consequentialists, a system of
criminal punishment is justified, if at all, by the good consequences that
result from the threat and imposition of punishment. Punishment, after all,
causes great harm to those punished and is otherwise a burden on the state.
It is justified, then, if its good effects outweigh its harms.
52. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
53. See Holiday v. Park, 683 A.2d 61, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (summarizing various state courts'
reasoning for applying ameliorative changes retroactively as well as federal courts' reasoning for
denying retroactive amelioration).
54. Richard S. Frase, Criminal Punishments, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW
197, 197 (Kermit L. Hall, et al. eds., 2002) ("[N]onretributive theories of punishment view criminal
penalties as justified on the basis of the desirable consequences (other than fairness) which are intended
to be achieved-in particular, the prevention of future criminal acts by this offender or other would-be
offenders.").
55. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a)(6) (2d ed. 2003) ("[A]lso called
revenge or retaliation, punishment ... is imposed by society on criminals in order to obtain revenge ...
because it is only fitting and just that one who has caused harm to others should himself suffer for it ...
Some contend that when one commits a crime, it is important that he receive commensurate punishment
in order to restore the peace of mind and repress the criminal tendencies of others. In addition, it is
claimed that retributive punishment is needed to maintain respect for the law and to suppress acts of
private vengeance. . . . Today it is commonly put forward under the rubric of 'deserts' or 'just
deserts."').
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A consequentialist legislator may think punishment produces good
effects in a number of ways: (1) by deterring specific offenders from re-
offending after release; 56 (2) by deterring potential offenders from engaging
in criminal activity;57 (3) by incapacitating offenders who have shown that
they will violate the law;58 (4) by denouncing harmful conduct and, thereby,
reinforcing socially acceptable norms;59  and (5) by rehabilitating or
reforming offenders so that they become productive, law abiding members
of society. 60 The consequentialist justification for punishment, then, is
forward-looking: it does not appeal to what wrongdoers deserve or how we
may rectify the wrongs of the past, but rather it appeals to the good
consequences produced by the threat and imposition of punishment.
In contrast, retributivism is backward-looking. For a retributivist,
the purpose of punishment is to "exact retribution by imposing 'deserved'
punishment in proportion to the offender's blameworthiness." 6' The
56. See Frase, supra note 54, at 197 ("Deterrence discourages future crimes by this offender
('special' deterrence) and by other likely offenders ('general' deterrence), by instilling and reinforcing
fear of punishment."); LAFAVE, supra note 55, at § 1.5(a)(1) ("[A]lso called intimidation, or, when the
deterrence theory is referred to as general deterrence, particular deterrence, criminal punishment aims to
deter the criminal himself (rather than to deter others) from committing further crimes, by giving him an
unpleasant experience he will not want to endure again. The validity of this theory has been questioned
by many, who point out the high recidivism rates of those who have been punished. . . . [Ilt has been
observed that our attempts at prevention by punishment may enjoy an unmeasurable degree of success,
in that without punishment for purposes of prevention the rate of recidivism might be much higher. This
assumption is not capable of precise proof, nor is the assertion that in some instances punishment for
prevention will fill the prisoner with feelings of hatred and desire for revenge against society and thus
influence future criminal conduct."); see also Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429 (2001).
57. Frase, supra note 54, at 197.
58. Id. ("Incapacitation prevents crime by imprisoning or executing dangerous offenders, thus
physically restraining them from committing crimes against the public."); see also LAFAVE, supra note
55, at § 1.5(a)(2) ("[A]lso expressed as incapacitation, isolation, or disablement ... society may protect
itself from persons deemed dangerous because of their past criminal conduct by isolating these persons
from society. If the criminal is imprisoned or executed, he cannot commit further crimes against society.
Some question this theory because of doubts that those who present a danger of continuing criminality
can be accurately identified. It has also been noted that resort to restraint without accompanying
rehabilitative efforts is unwise, as the vast majority of prisoners will ultimately be returned to society.
The restraint theory is sometimes employed to justify execution or life imprisonment without chance of
parole for those offenders believed to be beyond rehabilitation.").
59. See Frase, supra note 54, at 197-98 ("[T]he theory of denunciation (sometimes referred to as
the expressive function of punishment, indirect general prevention, or affirmative general prevention)
views criminal penalties as a means of defining and reinforcing important social norms of appropriate
behavior.").
60. See id. at 197 ("Rehabilitation is designed to prevent or lessen [an] offender's future criminal
behavior by addressing the causes of that behavior (through counseling, treatment, education, or
training)."); see also LAFAVE, supra note 55, at § 1.5(a)(3) ("[A]lso called correction or reformation,
we 'punish' the convicted criminal by giving him appropriate treatment, in order to rehabilitate him and
return him to society so reformed that he will not desire or need to commit further crimes. It is perhaps
not entirely correct to call this treatment 'punishment,' as the emphasis is away from making him suffer
and in the direction of making his life better and more pleasant. The rehabilitation theory rests upon the
belief that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes, that these causes can be identified, and
that on this basis therapeutic measures can be employed to effect changes in the behavior of the person
treated ... [T]he theory of reformation has not as yet shown very satisfactory results in practice.").
61. See Frase, supra note 54, at 197 ("What some have called 'defining' retributivism seeks to
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retributive goal of punishment is to do justice: to make sure that
wrongdoers suffer for their wrongdoing.
How much punishment is appropriate for a particular crime?
Legislators must answer this question in devising and reforming a criminal
code, and their opinions will depend on whether they focus on
consequentialist or retributivist goals of punishment. The primary focus of
consequentialist considerations will be deterrence, and the amount of
punishment for a given crime should adequately deter individuals from
engaging in that criminal behavior. On consequentialist grounds,
punishment can be unjustifiably harsh if the good consequences it produces,
including deterrence, could be achieved by a less harsh punishment.
Retributivist legislators will focus primarily on the blameworthiness of
actors who engage in that specific kind of criminal wrongdoing. If
offenders receive a sentence that makes them suffer more than they deserve,
then that punishment is unjustified on retributivist grounds. This Article
argues that regardless of whether legislators aim to fulfill consequentialist
or retributivist goals of punishment, the denial of retroactive amelioration is
inconsistent with both of these traditional goals of punishment. 62
B. Denying Retroactive Amelioration Offends Theories of Punishment
Withholding a lesser punishment from a pre- or post-final judgment
defendant is contrary to consequentialist and retributivist justifications for
punishment because the ameliorative legislative change reflects the
legislature's assessment that the prior penalty is no longer an adequate
deterrence or an appropriate penalty. In the leading case on retroactive
amelioration in which the defendant's conduct had been decriminalized,6
impose penalties which are directly proportional to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's
blameworthiness."); see also Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285, 290 (Common Pleas Ct.
1930) ("The second theory which has been urged as a basis for the imposition of penalties is that of
retribution. This may be regarded as the doctrine of legal revenge, or punishment merely for the sake of
punishment. It is to pay back the wrong-doer for his wrong-doing, to make him suffer by way of
retaliation even if no benefit result thereby to himself or to others. This theory of punishment looks to
the past and not to the future, and rests solely upon the foundation of vindictive justice. It is this idea of
punishment that generally prevails, even though those who entertain it may not be fully aware of their so
doing." (emphasis added)); see also Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim ofPunishment, 27
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (2003); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of
"Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 843 (2002); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of
Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453 (1997).
62. See Doren, supra note 36, at 1158.
63. Id. at 1159. ("The rationale in [People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956)] and [In re
Estrada, 408 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1966)] ... is that punishment serves to protect society, but that this
protection must be achieved with as little injury to criminals as possible within legislative boundaries.").
64. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 198-99. The defendant in Oliver was fourteen years old when he was
indicted for the murder of his younger brother in 1945. Committed to a psychiatric hospital, he was
eventually found not to be insane, at which point the state sought to proceed with the criminal
prosecution that had begun nine years earlier. In the interim, however, the New York legislature had
amended the law under which the defendant had been charged and indicted, specifically changing the
age at which a juvenile could be prosecuted for murder or any other serious crime. Id.
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the New York Court of Appeals stated that:
Th[e] application of statutes reducing punishment accords with
the best modem theories concerning the functions of punishment
in criminal law. According to these theories, the punishment or
treatment of criminal offenders is directed toward one or more of
three ends: (1) to discourage and act as a deterrent upon future
criminal activity [deterrence], (2) to confine the offender so that
he may not harm society [incapacitation] and (3) to correct and
rehabilitate the offender [rehabilitation]. 65
Reasoning that the legislature's decriminalization of the offense
amounted to the clearest expression of legislative intent to ameliorate what
was once a harsh penalty, the court held that to retain and apply the prior
penalty to decriminalized conduct would serve no purpose66 except
vengeance, which is an illegitimate aim of state-sanctioned punishment.6 7
The court's premise was that the reduced penalty reflected the legislature's
belief that the lesser penalty was enough to satisfy the various goals of the
criminal law,68 including deterring criminal activity, protecting society, and
punishing the offender, among others. Failure to apply the new lesser
punishment would therefore be a repudiation of the legislature's tacit
acknowledgement that the prior penalty was set too high. Moreover, the
Court recognized that both consequentialist and retributivist justifications
for punishment could be properly satisfied with the new punishment.6 9
Although the Court in Oliver was addressing the decriminalization of
conduct, the argument remains equally valid for the reclassification of
conduct and the reduction of a sentence.
65. Id. at 201-02.
66. Id at 202 ("Nothing is to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a
pronouncement; the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to satisfy a
desire for vengeance."). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has also stated: "[I]n light of the legislative
decision to mitigate penalties associated with the crime charged, we believe that all those whose cases
have not been reduced to final judgment prior to the enactment of the ameliorative statute should be
accorded the more lenient treatment. . . . To hold otherwise . . . would amount to nothing more than
arbitrary retribution in contravention of the obvious legislative purpose behind the mitigation of the
penalty." State v. Macarelli, 375 A.2d 944, 947 (R.I. 1977). In Macarelli, the State invoked the
jurisdiction's general saving statute to support the contention that the statute as it existed at the time of
the commission of the crime should govern, thus challenging the retroactive application of the
ameliorative legislative change arguing that the statutory amendment was an implied repeal of the
original statute. Even though the court agreed that the amended statute was an implied repeal and that
the general saving statute was applicable, the court still applied the ameliorative changes retroactively
because in the court's opinion to deny the application of the less severe penalty would "contravene the
manifest legislative intent" behind the reduction of the penalty. Id.
67. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 201.
68. Id. at 202 ("A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate
ends of the criminal law.").
69. Id.
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1. Retention of Prior Penalty is Contrary to Consequentialist Theories
As stated, the consequentialist goals of punishment include the
specific deterrence of those who have committed crime, the general
deterrence of potential offenders, and the incapacitation and possible
rehabilitation of wrongdoers. The denial of retroactive amelioration,
however, fails to accomplish any of those goals. Thus, a failure to
retroactively apply ameliorative legislation does not produce the good
effects morally necessary to outweigh the harms and burdens of keeping in
prison those offenders sentenced under the old law.
First, the denial of an ameliorative change does not do anything to
undermine the deterrent effect of any criminal sanction. The offender has
already been convicted and is being punished. The retroactive application
of ameliorative legislation will not undermine deterrence on anyone70
because no potential criminal will decide to commit a crime because of the
chance that even if he gets caught, one day the legislature might reduce the
punishment for that crime. It is rare that legislatures make their criminal
sentencing less harsh.n
If, however, the prior penalty is retained in light of an ameliorative
change, then the current offender may perceive that the punishment was
unfair and that re-offending is not only warranted but also justified. Thus,
denial of retroactive amelioration may have the effect of contributing to
recidivism. For the future offender, on the other hand, the decision to deny
retroactive amelioration is without merit. With the legislative change, the
original statute no longer exists except to continue to punish the current
offender; thus, any potential offender will not face the original punishment
but the new, ameliorated punishment. Apart from failing to deter future
criminal activity, the retention of the prior punishment following an
ameliorative legislative change fails to maximize the benefits to society and
is more costly, particularly under a theory of incapacitation.
The decision to retain a harsher punishment will result in an
offender remaining in custody and separated from society for a greater
70. Carol Crowther, The Future of Corrections, 381 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC.
Sci. 147, 149 (1969), ("The implicit assumptions have been: The more time served, the more deter-
rence, the more rehabilitation, the more community protection. We found no solid evidence that these
assumptions are correct, and substantial evidence that they are wrong."). But see In re Estrada, 408
P.2d 948, 956-57 (Cal. 1965) (Burke, J., dissenting) ("The certainty of punishment has always been
considered one of the strongest deterrents to crime. That certainty is best afforded when the punishment
described by the law existent at the time of commission of the crime is promptly and inexorably meted
out to those who violate the law. By changing the rules to make punishment uncertain the risk assumed
by those contemplating committing a crime is substantially reduced."); see also Vicory v. State, 400
N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ind. 1980) ("A severe sentence is presumably more of a deterrent than a lesser
sentence. Those who are not deterred by the more severe penalty exhibit greater depravity and should
not reap the benefits of the subsequent reclassification.").
71. See, e.g., Mike Allen, President Urges Harsher Penalties For Accounting Fraud Criminals,
THE TECH (Cambridge, Mass.), July 10, 2002, at 2 (discussing Congressional Democrats' claims that
President Bush's proposals are "much weaker" than the ones they proposed regarding sentencing for
those convicted of accounting fraud).
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period of time, which might increase society's safety from that individual.
That increased safety, however, comes with tangible financial and social
costs that could have been reduced or avoided altogether if the retroactive
application of the ameliorative legislative changes were allowed. Upon
reducing the penalty for the conduct, the legislature once again has made a
determination that less punishment will suffice to protect society, which
means that the conduct is no longer considered to be as serious. Thus the
individuals need not remain separated from society for as long as was
initially thought to keep others safe. To retain the original penalty means
that individuals who could have had their sentences reduced and been
released earlier remain wards of the state. Consequently, the jurisdiction
will continue to incur incarceration costs, such as housing, food, and health
care for inmates who could have been released sooner. In addition, the
failure to apply ameliorative changes retroactively will keep offenders
incapacitated longer and thus occupy space needed for more dangerous
inmates. Apart from the incarceration costs, there are social costs
associated with prolonged unnecessary incarceration, such as continued
social disruption of families and loss of family income.7 2
Denying retroactive application also does nothing to serve
punishment's expressive denouncing function73 aimed at reinforcing social
norms and behavior. The retention of a prior penalty in light of an
ameliorative change does not contribute to the moral condemnation
expressed by society and may, in fact, detract from it. The ameliorative
penalty reflects society's new views about the conduct being punished.
When the legislature reduces the penalty, it represents a new social view
about the conduct and how it should be punished-specifically, that society
no longer views it to be as serious and thus the penalty need not be as
severe. 74
Finally, the decision to deny retroactive amelioration and to retain
the original penalty does not assist in creating more productive members of
society. For adherents of the rehabilitative theory of punishment, the goal
is to create productive members of society by addressing the root causes of
72. See Drug Policy In America-A Continuing Debate: Report of the Task Force on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions to the King County Bar Association Board of Trustees, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 499,
555 (noting that non-economic costs, including social disruption, are involved in drug statutes and
stressing the potential gains in these areas through drug reform).
73. See State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334, 336 (Utah 1971) ("[I]t is the prerogative of the legislature,
expressing the will of the people, to fix the penalties for crimes; and the courts should give effect to the
enactment and the effective date thereof as so declared. . . . [T]o insist on the prior existing harsher
penalty is a refusal to accept and keep abreast of the process which has been continuing over the years of
ameliorating and modifying the treatment of antisocial behavior by changing the emphasis from
vengeance and punishment to treatment and rehabilitation.").
74. It is also a rationale of the federal courts' disregard of the federal general saving statute to
apply the ameliorative changes retroactively. See infra Part V.A.4. But see Holiday v. United States,
683 A.2d 61, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("When a newer social view decides that certain conduct is no longer
to be punished, the general [savings] statute steps in and imposes the punishment fixed by an earlier
generation .").
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criminality. However, the longer that an individual is incarcerated, the
more those root problems will become exacerbated, and the more time that
the offender has to become a "better" criminal.
2. Retention of Prior Penalty is Contrary to Retributivist Theories
For retributivists, the purpose of punishment is to penalize the
individual for his wrongful conduct. The punishment that is set needs to be
proportional to the offender's blameworthiness, but society can only
approximate a wrongdoers' blameworthiness. The setting of punishment is
simply inexact. However, an ameliorative change represents a legislative
acknowledgement, and by proxy a societal acknowledgement as well, that
the prior penalty was disproportionate to the conduct. To deny the
ameliorative change to previously convicted individuals would be to
acknowledge that the punishment was too harsh-it was unjustified-but
then not to do anything about it. To continue to apply the former, more
severe punishment following an ameliorative change is a repudiation of the
proportionality principle7 5 and undermines the retributivist goal of
punishment. According to the legislature, the new punishment is sufficient
enough to satisfy the retributive criminal law goals and a more excessive
penalty would therefore be morally unjustified.
The decision of the Georgia Legislature to deny the retroactive
application of the 2006 Amendment to Wilson is unsupported by either
utilitarian or retributivist justifications for punishment. The Georgia
Legislature's decision to amend the aggravated child molestation statute
was an acknowledgement that the original penalty was too severe; thus, the
legislature reduced it to reflect a new legislative intent7 6 for punishing
adolescents that engage in consensual sexual conduct. Recognizing the
disproportionality of the penalty for the aggravated child molestation statue
compared to the statutory rape statute for adolescents, the Georgia
Legislature decided that the original penalty was inappropriate and
amended the statute. In doing so, the Georgia Legislature initially acted
contrary to utilitarian and retributivist principles because the original
punishment neither satisfied the consequentialist justifications nor was
proportional to the conduct, and therefore exceeded the "just deserts"77 of
the offenders. When the Georgia Legislature amended the child
molestation statute, not only was it an acknowledgement that the prior
penalty was too harsh, but it also demonstrated that society was ill-served
by giving adolescents a mandatory minimum ten-year sentence for
consensual sexual conduct whereas elsewhere in the criminal code such
75. For a discussion of the proportionality principal as it applies to non-capital criminal cases, see
Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 527
(2008).
76. See Rep. Clarke Calls for Immediate Release of Genarlow Wilson, supra note 15.
77. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
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actions are punished with less severe penalties. Society does not derive a
benefit by continuing to punish Wilson at the original penalty level and
incurs a variety of costs, such as increased incarceration costs, for the
additional time that Wilson was to serve.
While the current practice of retroactive amelioration is a step in
the right direction, the partial retroactive amelioration, which is limited in
scope to pre-final judgment defendants and applies only in the absence of
express saving clauses, also fails to support the legitimate goals of
punishment. Therefore, this Article advocates for full retroactive
amelioration, enacted by the legislature, which seeks to make the current
practice more uniform by having jurisdictions do away with the express
saving clause and adopt a retroactive amelioration statute that includes a
general saving statute and an ameliorative amendment exception. More
importantly, such a change would expand the scope of retroactive
amelioration to individuals with finalized convictions.
III. The Proposed Retroactive Amelioration Statute
Legislatures bear the responsibility for setting the appropriate
punishment level for an offense as they seek to pursue legitimate goals of
punishment, such as retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation. By adopting
a retroactive amelioration statute, the legislature can orchestrate the manner
in which retroactive amelioration will be conducted. The retroactive
amelioration statute allows legislatures the opportunity to correct knee-jerk,
reactive lawmaking that may have occurred in response to a perceived
criminal justice epidemic. 7 9 By adopting a retroactive amelioration statute,
the legislature can formulate a uniform and consistent practice within a
jurisdiction, and the courts will no longer have to ascertain whether the
legislature intended to allow a defendant to be the beneficiary of an
ameliorative change. The goal of the retroactive amelioration statute is to
apply ameliorative changes retroactively, not only to defendants whose
cases are pending, but also to defendants whose cases have become final. It
is aimed at removing the temporal distinction that prevents defendants with
finalized convictions from benefiting from ameliorative criminal
78. I disagree with the position that retroactive law-making is best left to the discretion of the
courts. Particularly in the context of ameliorative changes, courts can decide either to implement such
changes or not, resulting in a lack of uniformity with respect to retroactivity. See Dan M. Kahan, Some
Realism About Retroactive Criminal Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 95, 116-17 (1997)
("The way to secure the benefits of retroactive lawmaking while minimizing the risks associated with it
is to confine the exercise of that power to the institution most likely to exercise it wisely [i.e. the courts].
The Ex Post Facto Clause helps to achieve that objective by denying retroactive lawmaking powers to
the legislature, which as a result has all the more incentive to delegate this vital power to courts."); see
also Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto
Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 35, 40 (1997) (arguing that although ex post facto principles
apply to courts in the criminal context, courts have not in fact afforded individuals significant protection
from retroactive judicial change).
79. GRUPP, supra note 35, at 4.
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legislation. The proposed statute encourages legislatures to expand the
scope of retroactive amelioration to defendants with finalized convictions,
to cease using the express saving clause as a legislative device to thwart the
triggering of the abatement doctrine, and to rely exclusively on the
retroactive amelioration statute, which contains a general saving clause. In
advance of discussing the details of the proposed statute, it is necessary to
define what constitutes amelioration.
A. Amelioration Typology
Amelioration is difficult to define.80 Borrowing from a previously
established typology,8t amelioration can be classified as either the
decriminalization of conduct; 82 the reclassification of conduct;83 or the
reduction of a sentence. 84 For example, when a legislature repeals a statute,
deleting it entirely from the criminal code and not replacing it, this
constitutes the decriminalization of conduct, also known as an "unqualified
repeal."8 Also, when there is a change in the designation of an offense
from a criminal violation to a civil one,86 this too is the decriminalization of
conduct.87  The change in the designation of conduct from criminal to civil
80. 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 42 n.3 (12th ed. 1932) (noting that there is some controversy
over what constitutes the mitigation of a prior penalty).
81. See Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime, supra note 30, at 131-45.
82. Id. at 141.
83. Id. at 139-40.
84. Id. at 131-39.
85. Id. at 121 n.10 ("For present purposes, an unqualified repeal is defined as a repeal without
express language that pending prosecutions and liability for past violations will not be extinguished.");
see also Jessie A. Amos, Case Law Update September 1, 1999-August 31, 2000, 2 TEX. TECH J. TEX.
ADMIN. L. 1, 99 (2001) ("When a right or remedy is dependent on a statute, the unqualified repeal of
that statute operates to deprive the party of all such rights that have not become vested or reduced to
final judgment.").
86. See, e.g., United States v. Blue Sea Line, 553 F.2d 445, 446 (5th Cir. 1977) (considering the
reclassification of a federal offense from criminal to civil offense); United States v. Mechem, 509 F.2d
1193, 1194-96 (10th Cir. 1975) (same).
87. Another example of the decriminalization of conduct is when a constitutional provision is
passed that decriminalizes conduct and creates a protected right, e.g., the repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment and its replacement with the Twenty First Amendment. In that same vein, the
decriminalization of conduct occurs when the legislature repeals a statute and then replaces it with an
affirmative right, e.g., the repeal of discriminatory laws with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (2006), and establishing an affirmative right not to be discriminated against. See Hamm v. City
of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 316 (1965). While the change in forum from a juvenile hearing to an adult
criminal trial has also been labeled as the decriminalization of conduct. This author disagrees and has
therefore classified this type of change as the reclassification of conduct. The change in forum from an
adult criminal trial to a juvenile proceeding has been considered by at least one court to be equivalent to
the decriminalization of conduct. See, e.g., People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 202 (N.Y. 1956)
(reclassifying offenses committed by individuals between the ages of twelve and fourteen from criminal
to juvenile offenses, thereby reducing the penalty and changing the legal forum). Juvenile proceedings,
technically, are considered non-criminal because the process lacks the full safeguards of an adult trial,
such as the right to jury trial. The process, however, has more elements associated with a criminal
prosecution rather than a civil proceeding. Thus, I categorize this type of change as a reclassification of
conduct.
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signals that the legislature no longer considers the conduct serious enough
to deprive an individual of liberty.88  In the second category, conduct is
reclassified resulting in an ameliorative sentencing change.
When a legislature changes the previous categorization of conduct
from a higher class felony to a lower one or from a felony to a misdemeanor
and reduces the punishment attached to a specific criminal offense, 8 9 it is
the reclassification of conduct. This type of ameliorative change often
occurs in two steps. Initially, the conduct is reclassified to a lower degree
and then the sentence is reduced accordingly so that it is proportional to the
other categories.90 The last remaining category of ameliorative changes is
the reduction of a sentence.
Reducing the sentence for an offense occurs when the legislature
lessens the penalty for proscribed conduct without changing the offense.
Theoretically, it is easy to assess whether this has occurred because the
new, or amended, statute has a penalty that is lower than the penalty in the
original statute. Practically, however, it is more complex because
sentencing is often presented as a range with minimum and maximum
values. For example, if the penalty for an offense is five years and the
legislature reduces it to three, then it is evident that the penalty has been
ameliorated. If, however, the penalty for an offense has a minimum and a
maximum value, then amelioration will be said to occur if the minimum is
decreased regardless of what happens with the maximum.91
When a legislature amends a statute and the change can be
categorized as either the decriminalization or the reclassification of conduct
or a sentence reduction, the change is therefore ameliorative and should be
given retroactive effect. Under the current framework, these changes are
either denied outright or restricted to pre-final judgment defendants. The
proposed statute removes the limitations and expands the scope of
88. The importance of protecting an individual from being deprived of liberty can be seen in the
numerous cases identifying under what circumstances counsel should attach in order to protect an
individual's liberty interest. See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (holding that a lawyer
must be appointed for a defendant before the imposition of a suspended prison sentence); Nichols v.
United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (holding that a court can only consider a defendant's uncounseled
misdemeanor in conviction in sentencing for a subsequent offence if that misdemeanor conviction did
not result in imprisonment); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that a state can only imprison
a defendant that had been represented by counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
(incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
defendants who cannot afford their own attorneys be provided with counsel).
89. See Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime, supra note 30, at 139.
90. Id. The Reclassification of Conduct category of amelioration raises concerns in the post-
Booker and Blakely era that the new penalty must be proven to a jury because the substantive elements
of the offense have changed. See supra note 53. However, Booker and Blakely focused on sentence
enhancements, not reductions, thus the Booker and Blakely restrictions are not applicable.
91. The following are examples of when an ameliorative change has occurred following a
decrease in the minimum sentencing value: (a) the minimum is decreased and the maximum remains
unchanged; (b) the minimum is decreased and the maximum is increased; and (c) both the maximum and
the minimum are decreased.
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retroactive amelioration to encompass all defendants to whom the amended
statute may apply
B. Expand the Scope of Retroactive Amelioration
A minority of jurisdictions has adopted an ameliorative amendment
exception to their general saving statutes that gives retroactive effect to
ameliorative legislative changes. It is restricted, however, to pre-final
judgment defendants, resulting in a limited number of defendants being
eligible to receive the benefits of an ameliorative sentencing change. The
proposed retroactive amelioration statute provides a post-final judgment
provision where individuals with finalized convictions can seek to have an
ameliorative sentencing change applied to them through a sentence
readjustment hearing.
After the passage of a statutory amendment that ameliorates the
sentence for specific conduct, a defendant who was formerly convicted
under the original statute should have his sentence adjusted accordingly. 92
It is the responsibility of the State to change a defendant's sentence to
adequately reflect the new penalty. The procedure will be for an
administrative sentencing board to review the legislative changes in which
the penalty for an offense has been ameliorated, identify the pool of eligible
defendants, and adjust their sentences accordingly. If, however, the
administrative sentencing board fails to adjust the sentence, then the
defendant can request a sentence readjustment hearing to have his sentence
readjusted in accordance with the new penalty. The sentence readjustment
hearing is an administrative procedure in which a duly elected or appointed
sentencing officer will adjust the defendant's sentence so that it comports
with the new ameliorative change. Once the sentence has been adjusted, the
defendant can petition for an expedited parole review if the jurisdiction has
retained its discretionary parole board process. Otherwise, the adjusted
sentence establishes the new parameters of the defendant's sentence.
Neither the change in the sentence nor the request for a readjustment will
provide the defendant with any additional rights to further challenge the
adjudication of guilt or to seek additional opportunities for judicial review
apart from the preexisting challenges that the defendant may already
92. Sundberg v. State, 652 P.2d 113, 116 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) ("[W]hile not binding on the
trial court, the new code does give an indication of current legislative intent and, absent factors in a
specific case warranting a harsher sentence, the defendant should be sentenced within the range of
sentences provided by the new code, at least to the extent that his conduct corresponds exactly to
conduct prohibited by a specific provision, or provisions of the new code."). One potential argument
against sentence readjustment is that the defendant may receive a sentencing windfall. For example, the
prosecution accepted a plea on a statute that is ameliorated later in exchange for the dismissal of charges
that have not been ameliorated. The defendant would then get the benefit of the reduced penalty. While
it appears to be windfall for the defendant, the process also holds true for the defendant. The defendant
may have been convicted under the non-ameliorated statute and thus would not be entitled to the change.
While leaving it up to chance may appear unseemly, defendants frequently take similar chances
whenever they elect to go to trial and take a chance on a jury verdict.
[Vol. 37:120
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possess. While the process is beneficial for the defendant, such as the
reduction of the sentence, it is also beneficial for society in the form of the
reduction of incarceration costs.
C. Cease Using the Express Saving Clause
Under the current practice, courts and legislatures have been willing
to permit retroactive amelioration provided that the newly amended statute
does not have an express saving clause. 9 3 Yet, the purpose of such clauses
has expanded considerably. The proponents of the express saving clause
initially created it to prevent the triggering of the common-law doctrine of
abatement. While the clause continues to perform that function, preventing
the premature termination of pending prosecutions, it is also used to retain
the original penalty following an ameliorative legislative change. To
prevent that manifest injustice from occurring, jurisdictions need to cease
using the express saving clause and adopt a retroactive amelioration statute
that has a general saving clause 94 that will prevent the abatement of
prosecutions and also allow for the retroactive application of ameliorative
changes. At present, there are only a few jurisdictions that do not have a
general saving statute95 and thus rely on either the express saving clause or
a constitutional saving clause to prevent abatement. This Article
recommends that jurisdictions cease using the express saving clause
altogether. If jurisdictions were to adopt the proposed retroactive
amelioration statute, then there would be no need for such a clause.
Moreover, the adoption of the proposed retroactive amelioration statute
would rein in courts that apply ameliorative changes despite the existence
of a general saving statute.
While the proposed retroactive amelioration statute appears to be a
monumental change to the criminal justice system, it is not. Legislatures
and courts allow exceptions such as amelioration even in the face of
principles that emphasize prospectivity. And, the original purpose of the
saving clause is to prevent the common-law doctrine of abatement, not
retroactive amelioration.
IV. Statutory Retroactivity and the Saving Clause
In general, retroactivity96 is a disfavored legal principle 97 because it
93. See infra Part V.
94. See infra Appendix 1.
95. See infra Appendix II (showing that only three jurisdictions-Alabama, Delaware, and
Mississippi--do not have general saving statutes).
96. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 41:1 ("The terms 'retroactive' and 'retrospective' are
synonymous in judicial usage and may be employed interchangeably.").
97. Courts are reluctant to give retroactive effect to constitutional rule changes, and also rely on a
presumption against statutory retroactivity to prevent the retroactive application of legislation. See
Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) ("The presumption against statutory retroactivity
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is considered unfair 98 to change the laws upon which conduct is based and
then apply the new law to that conduct. Statutory retroactivity9 is no
different.100 The prevailing thought is that applying a new or amended
statute retroactively to antecedent conduct is disadvantageous because an
individual should be aware of the law in advance of acting.' 0 , Retroactive
lawmaking may be disfavored, but it is not unconstitutional provided that
the new or amended statute does not criminalize new conduct or impose a
more severe penalty 02 for an existing crime. Moreover, retroactive statutes
are often necessary. 03  Even still, statutes are presumed to operate
prospectively.104 To insure that legislative changes are not given retroactive
effect, this principle of nonretroactivity is reflected constitutionally, in the
ex post facto, 05 retroactive,106 and saving clauses;107 statutorily, in the
has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after
the fact."); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) ("First, a new rule should be applied retroactively
if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual contact beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe. Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the
observance of 'those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.").
98. Seeman, supra note 31, at 93; Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A
Basic Principle ofJurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 777 (1935); Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws
and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231, 237 (1927) [hereinafter Smith I]; see also SUTHERLAND, supra
note 25, § 41:2 ("A fundamental principle of jurisprudence holds that retroactive application of new
laws is usually unfair." There are, however, two exceptions to this general principle. If the statute: (1)
confers benefits, provided that a class of persons is not arbitrarily deprived of the benefits; and (2)
"bring[s] legal rights and relationships into conformity with what people thought they were.").
99. See Smith I, supra note 98, at 231-32 ("The term retroactive, as applied to legislation, seems
to be used with a number of different meanings. One is that a law is retroactive if it extinguishes or
impairs legal rights already acquired by the individual under the laws previously existing. . . . Another
meaning is that a law is retroactive if it assumes to give effect to a past event, in order to create a present
right or duty. And a third is that a law is retroactive when it assumes to give to a past event the effect of
creating rights and duties ab initio, or as of some time prior to the retroactive law.").
100. See Debra Lyn Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative
Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 453 (2001); Smead, supra note 98, at 780-81; see also 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 415 (1999).
101. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 41:2 ("There is general consensus that notice or warning of a
rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects will be judged."); see also Prospective
Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, supra note 47, at 944-45.
102. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960); Smith I, supra note 98, at 234 ("Since there is no provision,
either in the Federal Constitution or in most state constitutions, which expressly forbids retroactive
legislation . . . 'retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contracts or partake of the
character of ex post facto laws are not condemned or forbidden by any part of the constitution."').
103. See Smith 1, supra note 98, at 237 ("It is perhaps always preferable to legislate before rather
than after the event, but situations arise where a law may be better late than never and a retroactive law
than no law at all."); Smith II, supra note 21, at 411 ("The first thought ... is that American authorities
denounce retroactivity in the abstract but frequently sustain it in the particular case.").
104. Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J.
1015, 1016 (2006).
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No ... ex post facto law shall be passed."); U.S. CONST. art. I
§ 10 ("No state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto law."). See generally, Ryan D. Frei, Casenote, Does
Time Eclipse Crime? Stogner v. California and the Court's Determination of the Ex Post Facto
Limitations on Retroactive Justice, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 1011 (2004) (examining the Supreme Court's
attempt to give firm judicial guidance in the gray area of the application of the ex post facto clauses to
criminal statutes of limitations in Stronger v. Calfornia, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)).
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express saving clauses 08 and general saving statutes;109 and, judicially, in a
presumption against retroactivity. 10  There are, however, several
recognized exceptions to the principle of nonretroactivity.
First, the legislature's intent to allow statutory retroactivity is
expressly or impliedly indicated. Second, the statutory amendment is either
ameliorative or curative."' And finally, legislative retroactivity is required
when the "reasonable expectations" of the parties require it.112  These
circumstances permit the retroactive application of a statute, provided that
the legislative change does not result in an injustice, 113 but they do not
require retroactive amelioration. The saving provisions are a legislative
device that were created and are used for a limited purpose. The purpose of
the clauses is specifically to counter the common-law doctrine of
abatement, 1 14 a doctrine that has been both widely accepted"' 5 and roundly
106. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11 ("No . . . law ... retrospective in its operation ... shall be
passed by the general assembly."); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, Para. 10; IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 12; MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 17 ("That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the
existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal are oppressive, unjust and incompatible
with liberty .... ); MO. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.H. CONST. part 1, art. 23 ("Retrospective laws are highly
injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of
civil causes, or the punishment of offenses."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Retrospective laws, punishing
acts committed before the existence of such laws and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive,
unjust, and incompatible with liberty . . . ."); OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28 ("The general assembly shall
have no power to pass retroactive laws . . . ."); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16; see
also infra Appendix II.
107. See Margaret A. Burnham, Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: The Savings
Clause in the Law of the Commonwealth of the Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 249, 249
(2005) (discussing the use of the constitutional saving clause to retain the preexisting laws prior to a
nation's independence); see also infra Appendix II.
108, See infra Part IV.A.
109. See id.
110. Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994).
111. Kendall, 530 A.2d at 336 ("Under this exception, an amendment to a statute can be given
retroactive effect if it is designed merely to carry out or explain the intent of the original statute....
[A]n amendment which falls within the curative exception can be retroactively applied consistent with
the general rule of prospectivity because its purpose is to remedy a perceived imperfection in or
misapplication of a statute and not to alter the intended scope or purposes of the original act."); see also
SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 41:11 ("A curative act is a statute passed to cure defects in prior law, or
to validate legal proceedings, instruments, or acts of public and private administrative authorities....
Generally, curative acts are made necessary by inadvertence or error in the original enactment of a
statute or in its administration ... [and] can be given retroactive effect if it is designed merely to carry
out or explain the intent of the original legislation.").
112. Fasching v. Kallinger, 546 A.2d 1094, 1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
113. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, § 41:2; see also Fasching, 546 A.2d at 1096 (noting that
legislative changes will not be given retroactive effect if it results in an injustice).
114. See Seeman, supra note 31, at 80; Effect of Repeal ofa Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions
for Prior Acts, supra note 29, at 744-45 (reviewing the history of the rule, and noting that since the 19th
century it has been applied consistently); Ruud, supra note 33, at 286 ("The function of the savings
clause is to express the legislative intention to preserve the designated expectancies, rights or obligations
from immediate destruction or interference."); see also supra note 29 (discussing the origins of the
doctrine).
115. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801) (adopting the abatement
doctrine in American jurisprudence); see also Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 323 (1964)
("The [abatement] doctrine has its origins in the English common law ... and has been embraced in
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criticized,116 not to prevent retroactive amelioration. To understand the
intended limited scope of the saving provisions, it is necessary also to
understand the abatement doctrine and its application.
A. The Saving Provisions
In order to be effective, a legislature is required to insert an express
saving clause' into a new or amended statute. The inclusion of an express
saving clause in the newly amended statute demonstrates the legislature's
intent that all ongoing prosecutions should continue unabated and not be
subjected to a "legislative pardon." 18 By inserting an express saving
clause, the legislature makes a clear and unequivocal statement that the
amended statute shall not have any effect on either the status or prosecution
of prior conduct. With numerous statutory changes, legislatures have often
failed to include an express saving clause in the amended statute, resulting
in the unanticipated triggering of the abatement doctrine. In response to
this "legislative inadvertence,"ll 9 the general saving statute has been created
and adopted at the federal levell 2 0 and in a majority of state jurisdictions. 121
The general saving statute's purposel 2 2 is to serve as a standing rule
of the legislature's intent to save previously commenced prosecutions from
American state and federal jurisprudence." (internal citations omitted)).
116. See, e.g., Albert Levitt, Repeal of Penal Statutes and Effect on Pending Prosecutions, 9
A.B.A. J. 715, 715 (1923) (claiming that there is no "adequate reason" for keeping the abatement
doctrine as it is).
117. For example, the specific saving clause contained in Georgia's amended aggravated child
molestation statute reads in pertinent part: "The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status
as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing,
repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a
result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment." 2006 Ga. Laws 379 (emphasis added).
118. See MacKenzie, supra note 29, at 173 (suggesting that the abatement doctrine is based on an
inference of legislative pardon).
119. See, e.g., Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("As a way of
preventing abatements of criminal prosecutions and other liabilities when legislatures failed to provide
special savings clauses in the repealing legislation, state legislatures began in the last century to adopt
general savings statutes applicable thereafter to all repeals, amendments, and reenactments of criminal
and civil liabilities."); LaPorte v. State, 132 P. 563, 564-65 (Ariz. 1913) ("The history of legislation ...
shows that through the inattention, carelessness, and inadvertence of the lawmaking body crimes and
penalties have been abolished, changed, or modified after the commission of the offense and before trial
in such material way as to effect many legislative pardons. To prevent such mistakes and miscarriages
ofjustice many of the states have enacted general saving statutes.").
120. 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
121. See infra Appendix II for a list of savings provisions in each state.
122. Ruud, supra note 33, at 292-93:
A savings clause may be general or specific; that is, it may be of general
application to all acts of the legislature or it may apply to the specific act of which
it is a part. The general savings clause may be found in either the constitution or
the statutes. The general savings statute, in turn, is generally a part of a general
interpretation act.
See also Seeman, supra note 31, at 80 ("The legislation may be of two sorts: it may be precise and
definite, or it may be general in terms.").
HeinOnline  -- 37 Am. J. Crim. L. 24 2009-2010
2009] In With the New, Out With the Old 25
abatement. 123 Most notably, the statute operates to prevent the premature
termination of a prosecution following a legislative change in which the
penalty is increased, i.e. a technical abatement, 124 and would thus be barred
under the Ex Post Facto Clause. With the general saving statute, and by
extension the constitutional saving clause, the burden of having to include
an express saving clause following each statutory change is alleviated thus
removing the concern of unwarranted abatement which if triggered has dire
consequences.
B. The Common-Law Doctrine of Abatement
The common law doctrine of abatement 2 5 terminates all pending
prosecutions following a legislative changel 26  unless the legislature
expresses a contrary intent by the insertion of an express saving clause in
the new or amended statute.127 The abatement doctrine is based upon the
principle that a legislative change is tantamount to a repeal of the existing
statute, even if the legislature has re-enacted the statute in much the same
form or has simply amended portions of it.128  The abatement doctrine is
based upon the fundamental premise that any legislative change without an
express saving clause is equivalent to the statute having never existed.12 9
123. See Ruud, supra note 33, at 298 ("The purpose in enacting a general savings statute is to
establish a general legislative policy concerning the effect of repeals and to avoid having to include a
specific savings clause in each act in order to carry out that policy.").
124. People v. Alexander, 224 Cal. Rptr. 290, 300 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("[Tlhe California
Supreme Court opined that this general saving clause was not meant to abrogate the common law rule,
but only to prevent its mechanical application and forestall the 'technical abatement' of prosecutions
where the repeal of a statute was clearly not intended as a pardon for past conduct.").
125. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
126. See Levitt, supra note 116, at 716 ("[T]he repeal of a statute was an absolute bar to a
prosecution for an offense committed against the statute.... [I]t has consistently been affirmed that ...
the repeal of a statute without a saving clause has as its result the release or acquittal of any one who is
under prosecution for an act committed against a repealed statute." (citing United States v. Passmore, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 372 (1804))); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230 (1964) (stating the "universal
common-law rule" that "when the legislature repeals a criminal statute or otherwise removes the State's
condemnation from conduct that was formerly deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a
pending criminal proceeding charging such conduct."); R. Inhabitants of Mawgan (1838) 112 Eng. Rep.
927, 928 (Q.B.) ("[T]he repeal of a statute does not invalidate what has been done under its authority
before the repeal. The effect of the repeal is ... to prevent any step being taken under the authority of
the repealed Act.").
127. See 1 HALE, supra note 29, at 291 ("[W]hen an offense is made ... by an act of parliament,
and then those acts are repealed, the offenses committed before such repeal, and the proceedings
thereupon are discharged by such repeal, and cannot be proceeded upon after such a repeal, unless a
special clause in the act of repeal be made enabling such proceeding after the repeal, for offenses
committed before the repeal."). Later, the expression of that contrary intent would be manifested
through the general saving statute or the constitutional saving clause.
128. See, e.g., Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that, in the
absence of a savings statute, legislative change abates criminal prosecutions "whether the legislation was
an outright repeal or merely an amendment or reenactment").
129. Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281, 283 (1809) ("The court is ... of opinion, that
this cause is to be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced; and if no sentence had been
pronounced, it has been long settled, on general principles, that after the expiration or repeal of a law, no
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Jurists and scholars alike, however, have criticized the doctrine for being
flawed and unsupported from its inception' 30 and for its continued use
without thoughtful analysis.13 1  In defense of the doctrine, courts have
reasoned that a legislative change is analogous to a pardon of the actual
offensel3 2 and results in a rescission of the court's power and authority to
continue the prosecution.' 33
Commentators nonetheless have emphasized that the sole authority
of the court does not emanate from the legislature, and thus total authority
cannot be divested simply because a legislative change has occurred.134
These same commentators have also objected to the notion that a legislative
change means that the statute never existed and that the conduct that was
committed is no longer socially proscribed and is therefore not punishable.
They have contended that this argument is flawed because it obscures the
fact that not only was the conduct committed, but it was also illegal at the
time of its commission.'3 5  They have therefore suggested that the
abatement doctrine is unjust because offenders who violate an existing
statute are absolved from liability simply because the legislature enacted a
penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in
force."); see also Effect of Repeal of a Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions for Prior Acts, supra note
29, at 748.
130. See Levitt, supra note 116, at 715 ("The writer [Albert Levitt] ventures to believe that the
existing rule [the doctrine of abatement] is based upon the continued, thoughtless acceptance of an
unsupported statement made by Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown[.]"); see also Effect of Repeal of a
Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions for Prior Acts, supra note 29, at 747 ("The rule, which appears so
practically undesirable and which was based upon no authority in Hale's time, has received little
analysis at the hands of the courts or writers.").
131. See Levitt, supra note 116, at 716 ("[N]o court seems to have thought the matter worthy of a
thorough analysis in light of its history. .. . That a rule of such importance to the general welfare should
have been accepted without question and without change for two hundred and fifty years is. . . . as
remarkable an example of thoughtless judicial laissez faire as can be found in the history of the criminal
law.").
132. See Effect of Repeal of a Criminal Statute Upon Prosecution for Prior Acts, supra note 29, at
749 ("[I]t is argued that the repeal acts as a 'legislative pardon', that the legislature intended thereby to
forgive past offenders."); Seeman, supra note 31, at 80 ("The common law rule has always been that
once a law has been repealed, it shall henceforth be as if it had never existed, but this rule has often been
modified by legislation and by qualifying judicial rules."); see also Sekt v. Justice's Ct. of San Rafael,
159 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1945) ("[The common law rule of abatement] is based on presumed legislative
intent, it being presumed the repeal was intended as an implied legislative pardon.").
133. See Levitt, supra note 116, at 716 (listing four reasons given by courts for the doctrine of
abatement: the absence of a law to be enforced by the courts, the absence of an offense to be punished;,
the release of an offender's guilt, and the absence of power in the court to proceed with the prosecution).
134. Id. See also Effect of Repeal of a Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions for Prior Acts, supra
note 29, at 748-49 (arguing that the authority of the courts to enforce punishment does not depend on a
repealed statute, but rather depends upon the Constitution or some other statute); John C. Eastman,
Philosopher King Courts: Is the Exercise of Higher Law Authority Without a Higher Law Foundation
Legitimate?, 54 DRAKE L. REv. 831, 834-35 (2006) (asserting that it is universally acknowledged in this
country that the Constitution represents a higher law than statutory law, and that in the event of a
conflict, it is the duty of the judiciar6 to give effect to the Constitution).
135. See Effect of Repeal of a Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions for Prior Acts, supra note 29,
at 748 ("At the time of commission the act was wrong as a substantive matter; this fact cannot be
changed by the repeal.").
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change.1 6  These commentators' assessment of the abatement doctrine is
partially correct. The court's power and authority to maintain a previously
commenced prosecution should continue unabated when the legislature
repeals and reenacts or amends a statute. Its power and authority should,
however, be divested when there is an unqualified repeal of a statute which
amounts to the decriminalization of the conduct. In this instance, that
which was once proscribed is no longer criminal and thus any existing
prosecution should be terminated. An unqualified repeal is clearly
ameliorative and should therefore be applied retroactively both to pre- and
post-final judgment defendants.13 7  It is not the same however when the
legislature repeals and reenacts or amends a statute.
Unlike the decriminalization of conduct which is a statement that
once proscribed conduct is no longer illegal, a legislative repeal and
reenactment or amendment of a statute is a reassessment of the appropriate
penalty for that which is still proscribed conduct. Therefore, these changes
should not trigger the abatement doctrine, regardless of whether there is a
saving clause or whether the penalty is increased 3 8 or decreased.139 The
idea that the prosecution should be terminated in the absence of a saving
clause ignores the objective indication of the legislature's intent-
represented by the retention of the offense and an associated penalty-that
previously commenced prosecutions are not being pardoned. When the
penalty is increased, the legislative intent to continue the prosecution is not
in doubt, as the new penalty indicates that the previous punishment was set
too low and thus was insufficient to accomplish legitimate goals of
punishment. Under such circumstances, the prosecution should not be
abated even if the legislature fails to insert an express saving clause or the
jurisdiction lacks a general saving statute or a constitutional saving clause.
It is less clear whether the abatement doctrine should apply when
the legislature repeals and reenacts or amends a statute and decreases the
penalty, but the principle remains the same. The legislature did not intend
to release the offender from criminal liability, but rather intended to
properly reflect the amount of punishment necessary to achieve the goals of
the criminal law. The newly amended statute therefore is a reflection of the
136. See Levitt, supra note 116, at 715.
137. See Effect of Repeal of a Criminal Statute Upon Prosecutions for Prior Acts, supra note 29,
at 748 ("A reason often given for the (abatement] doctrine is that upon the repeal of a statute it is as if
the statute never existed; consequently prior acts cannot be criminal. . . . [T]his reason should apply
with equal force to offenders who were convicted, a result which the courts have not admitted.").
138. Id. at 747 ("When there is an implied repeal, as when the second statute covers the same
subject matter but increases the penalty, some courts have departed from the general rule [i.e. abatement
of the pending prosecution]. The theory in these cases appears to be that the legislature intended only a
partial repeal, i.e., the first statute is discontinued as to future acts, but remains in force as to conduct
prior to the second statute.").
139. People v. Alexander, 224 Cal. Rptr. 290, 300 n.21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he Supreme
Court has also expressed the view that under these particular circumstances (and even where a new
statute lessens punishment), no saving clause is needed to prevent abatement because the reenacted
proscription itself rebuts the presumption that the repeal was meant as a pardon.").
272009]
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legislature's evaluation that the former penalty was too harsh, not that the
prosecution for the offense should cease. 140 The use of the saving
provisions to maintain the prosecution is appropriate, but they should not
result in the retention of the prior original penalty following a reduction in
the penalty because it would undermine the legislative intent of mitigation.
Courts and legislatures in a minority of jurisdictions have adopted this
distinction, 14 1 by either circumventing their jurisdictions' general saving
statutesl42 or adopting an ameliorative amendment exception to the general
saving statutes, both of which achieve legitimate goals of punishment. 14 3 A
legislative change that reduces a penalty is an indication that the legislature,
as the representative of the people, has determined anew that the prior
penalty was excessive. To withhold that new penalty from defendants is
inconsistent with the purposes of punishment and is unjust. A minority of
jurisdictions that agree with that principle apply such ameliorative changes
retroactively, either in the courts or in the legislature. While these
jurisdictions are inclined to engage in retroactive amelioration, even they
have constraints that the proposed retroactive amelioration statute
addresses.
V. Current Retroactive Amelioration Practice
A minority of state supreme courtsl 4 4 and legislatures l4 give
retroactive effect to ameliorative legislation. 14 6  Nonetheless, the current
140. The legislature may have reduced the penalty to accomplish other goals and the penalty
reduction may be a collateral consequence of such reasons. However, the penalty that is attached to an
offense is an expression of the gravity of the offense, i.e., its nature and seriousness. Thus, if the
legislature has reduced the penalty, it is the objective indicia of the legislature's evaluation of what an
appropriate sentence is for that offense and the length of time necessary to satisfy the goals of
punishment.
141. See infra Part V.
142. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("We ... focus on the quite
different approaches the state courts . . . and the federal courts . . . have taken in construing general
savings statutes. . . . [T]he predominant state court view . . . favors retroactive application of
ameliorative sentencing legislation despite a general savings statute. . . . [T]he federal court approach-
derived substantially from Supreme Court authority ... uses the federal general savings statute to bar
retroactive application unless the new sentencing legislation itself 'expressly' says it shall apply to
pending cases.").
143. See infra Appendix II.
144. See infra Part V.A. 1-3.
145. See infra Part V.B.
146. See State v. Stafford, 129 P.3d 927, 929-30 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (applying ameliorative
sentencing provisions to pre-final judgment defendants "in the interests of justice and to comport with
the legislature's apparent intent"). But see Picetti v. State, 192 P.3d 704, 711 (Nev. 2008) (rejecting the
doctrine of amelioration). Indiana has also recognized a common law doctrine of amelioration based
upon an inference of legislative intent. See Maynard v. State, 367 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)
(adopting an amelioration doctrine based on dicta in Wolfe v. State, 362 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977)). The doctrine was later ratified by the Indiana Supreme Court in Lewandowski v. State, 389
N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ind. 1979). The Maynard Court suggested that the amelioration doctrine is based upon
a constitutional provision. See Maynard, 367 N.E.2d at 7 (citing IND. CONST. art. I, § 18, which states
that the penal code shall be based on principles of reformation rather than vindictive justice). Indiana
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practice of retroactive amelioration is inadequate because an entire class of
defendants, namely post-final judgment defendants, is barred from
benefiting from the ameliorative sentencing changes. The proposed
retroactive amelioration statute provides full retroactive amelioration so
post-final judgment defendants are treated similarly to pre-final judgment
defendants.
A. Judicial Retroactive Amelioration
A minority of state supreme courts apply ameliorative legislative
changes retroactively despite the existence of general saving statutes. 14 7 In
doing so, they argue that the principles of construction with respect to the
general saving statutes are not prohibitive;14 8 the ambiguity in the language
of the general saving statute allows for retroactive amelioration;14 9 and the
purpose of the general saving statute was to prevent technical abatement
and not retroactive amelioration.s 0 If the newly amended statute, however,
contains an express saving clause or the case has become final, then the
courts do apply the ameliorative changes.
1. Statutory Construction Rules Encourage Retroactive Amelioration
Courts have looked to principles of statutory construction as a basis
to disregard the general saving statute and to apply ameliorative sentencing
changes retroactively. Because the general saving statute is to be given
effect when no contrary legislative intent exists, 15 courts argued that the
reduction in the sentence following a legislative change is an expression of
that contrary intent.152 Thus, the court must give retroactive effect to
courts have applied the doctrine provided that the following is established: "(1) whether [the defendant]
was sentenced after the effective date of the statute; (2) whether the amended statute is more lenient than
the previous version, that is, whether the amendment is truly ameliorative; and (3) the legislature's
intent." Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In Indiana, a statutory change is
considered ameliorative if the maximum penalty value has been decreased. Hellums v. State, 758
N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, the court decides whether a legislative change is
ameliorative, which makes the process of retroactive amelioration inconsistent within jurisdictions and
thus necessitates the adoption of my proposed retroactive amelioration statute.
147. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (summarizing state supreme
court decisions across several jurisdictions regarding general saving statutes and the retroactive
application of ameliorative criminal legislation.).
148. See infra Part V.A.1.
149. See infra Part V.A.2.
150. See infra Part V.A.3.
151. See People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 201 (N.Y. 1956) ("These sections . . . are not to be
applied when the 'general object' of the statute, 'or the context of the language construed, or other
provisions of law indicate that a different meaning or application was intended' . . . . They have been
read by this court to 'provide merely a principle of construction,' which governs '[i]n the absence of
contrary intent' and which applies 'with special force to statutes which otherwise would be ex post facto
or would deprive persons of substantial rights."' (internal citations omitted)).
152. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 472 (N.D. 1986) (arguing that the legislature had an
"obvious" (though unspoken) desire for retroactive application of reduced mandatory-minimum
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ameliorative legislative changes despite the fact that there is a general
saving statute that is intended to save the prior statute in its entirety,
including prosecution and punishment. Not to apply the changes would be
to deny the intent of the legislature. Other courts, also relying on principles
of statutory construction, have looked to past legislative conduct in which
the legislature has vested in the court the discretion regarding whether
ameliorative sentencing changes should be applied retroactively. 53
Although similar to the relying upon the rules of statutory construction as
determinative of whether the general saving statute be applied, other courts
have looked to the language of the jurisdiction's general saving statute and
declared that because it is ambiguous, it does not prevent the retroactive
application of ameliorative legislative changes.
2. Ambiguous Statutory Language Allows Retroactive Amelioration
The use of ambiguous language in the general saving statute has
permitted courts to disregard the statute and apply ameliorative legislative
changes retroactively.154 . Because of a lack of specificity in the general
saving statute-such as failing to identify whether the original or the
amended statute should be applied to an offender-courts have concluded
that ameliorative changes can be applied retroactively. According to these
courts, the general saving statute was created to maintain the pending
prosecutions, thereby prohibiting the triggering of the abatement doctrine,
and not intended to retain the original, harsher penalty. 5 s Other
jurisdictions also have focused on the language of the general saving
statutes and similarly found that ameliorative statutory changes could be
given retroactive effect even though the general saving statute suggested
penalties; based on the reasoning in Oliver and Estrada the court was impressed, very simply, by the
"compelling inference that ... the former penalty was too harsh and that the [new] and lighter
punishment was the appropriate penalty.").
153. See State v. Von Geldem, 638 P.2d 319, 322 (Haw. 1981) ("The legislature ... has thus
established a pattern of conduct evidencing an inclination to allow the trial court in the exercise of its
sound discretion to apply, in individualized circumstances, the 'more enlightened sentencing provisions'
of the Code, even where the crime was committed before its effective date."). The trial court imposed a
mandatory minimum five-year sentence on the defendant following a conviction for promoting a
dangerous drug in the second degree, coupled with the fact that the defendant had a prior conviction.
The legislature amended the statute and provided the sentencing court with the discretion to impose a
lesser mandatory minimum sentence in the face of strong mitigating circumstances. Id. at 321-22.
154. See In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 953 (Cal. 1966) ("[W]hile [the legislature] positively
expressed its intent that an offender of a law that has been repealed or amended should be punished, [it]
did not directly or indirectly indicate whether he should be punished under the old law or the new one.").
The defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor narcotics possession and was diverted to a drug
rehabilitation center whereupon he, without using force or violence, effectuated his escape. At the time
of the escape, the statute that governed his offense required a one-year minimum sentence from the date
of return to the facility before the defendant could become eligible for parole. Id. at 950.
155. Id. at 951 ("When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has
obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is
proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act.").
30 [Vol. 37:1
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otherwise. 15 6
In one case where a defendant had pled guilty but fled the
jurisdiction prior to sentencing, the court reasoned that the language of the
general saving statute required the penalty to have been incurred in order to
prevent the retroactive application of the ameliorative sentencing change.157
The court held this to be true even though it was the defendant's action of
leaving the jurisdiction that prevented the imposition of the penalty,15 8
remarking that the overriding concern was not that the defendant had
benefited from his culpable conduct, but, more importantly, that the
conditions as set forth in the general saving statute had not been satisfied. 159
Apart from looking to the language of the general saving statutes as
evidence that retroactive amelioration is permitted, a minority of courts has
focused on the intended purpose of the saving provisions and emphasized
that the saving provisions were created for the express purpose of
preventing technical abatement, not the retroactive application of
ameliorative legislative changes.
3. Preventing Technical Abatement, Not Retroactive Amelioration
Despite the existence of a general saving statute, courts have given
retroactive effect to ameliorative legislative changes, stating that preventing
the retroactive application of such changes was not the intended purpose
behind the creation of the saving clause.' 60  Looking to the history
156. See Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1971). The defendant in Belt pled guilty to
issuing a fraudulent check and was subsequently placed on probation without a sentence being imposed.
The Utah Supreme Court decided that the ameliorative provision of an amended statute should be
applied to the defendant. By leaving the state without permission, the defendant subsequently violated a
condition of his probation. At the probation revocation hearing, the defendant was sentenced to a
maximum of five years in state prison. After the guilty plea, the legislature amended the statute and the
offense under which the defendant had been charged was dramatically altered. Under the newly
amended statute, however, the defendant would have faced a fine and a maximum sentence in the county
jail of not more than six months. Id. at 792; see also Doren, supra note 36, at 1157.
157. See Belt, 479 P.2d at 792 ("A new policy having been adopted by the legislature concerning
the punishment for the offense we are here concerned with [whether] it should inure to the defendant's
benefit even though the offense had been committed and the plea thereto made prior to the amendatory
legislation.").
158. Id. at 793 (Henriod, J, dissenting) ("The main opinion must concede that the defendant is
compromising this court by the simple device of absenting himself, in complete defiance of his agreed
conditions for probation, from appearance at court on the date for his sentence, which was long before
the effective date of the statute that he now invokes.").
159. Id. at 792.
160. See People v. Schultz, 460 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Mich. 1990) ("Our general saving statute was
adopted to amend a technically correct but logically absurd result that arose from a legislative oversight.
To ignore the plain intent of the Legislature in this case would lead to an equally anomalous result."). In
Schultz, one of the defendants, Shultz, was convicted of violating Michigan's drug possession statute
and faced a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years. The other defendant, Sand, was also
convicted of drug possession and faced a mandatory minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty years.
For Schultz, the legislative change occurred ten months after the sentence was imposed but while the
case was on appeal. For Sand, however, the ameliorative change occurred approximately one month
prior to the date of sentencing. Id. at 506-09.
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surrounding the use and application of the general saving statute,161 Courts
have reasoned that the general saving statute was created to thwart technical
abatement and that to deny retroactive amelioration would be to act
contrary to the intent of the legislature. 162 To reiterate, briefly, the general
saving statute was created to remedy a historical legal anomaly in which a
defendant would be released from liability following a legislative change
where an increase in the existing penalty had occurred. 163 It was not
intended to be used to retain harsher punishments, but simply to prevent the
triggering of the common-law doctrine of abatement.16 In refusing to
apply the general saving statutes, the actions of these courts could
potentially be labeled as judicial activism. These courts, however, are not
demonstrating judicial activism but acting in accord with the original
legislative purpose and intent of the saving provisions, thus exercising
judicial restraint.165 Much like the majority of state courts, the federal
courts have not been inclined to disregard the federal general saving statute,
except on two occasions.
4. Exceptions to the Federal General Saving Statute
Enacted in 1871, the federal general saving statute166 was construed to
161. Id. at 509-10 ("The repeal of any statute or part thereof shall not have the effect to release or
relinquish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute or any part thereof, unless the
repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute and part thereof shall be treated as still
remaining in force for the purpose of instituting or sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the
enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability.").
162. See supra note 134.
163. See Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 527 ("The history ... indicates that the Legislature enacted the
general saving statute in response to a factual scenario vastly different from that presented before our
Court today. [It] was specifically adopted to abrogate an anomaly resulting from the interplay between
the common law abatement doctrine and the constitutional Ex Post Facto Clause.").
164. But see Gee v. State, 508 N.E.2d 787, 788 (Ind. 1987) ("The savings clause ... provides that
an offense ... shall be prosecuted and remains punishable under ... the statute in force at the time the
offense was committed."); State v. Cramer, 413 P.2d 994, 996 (Kan. 1966) (noting that the general
savings statute preserves "all rights and remedies under a repealed statute when the repealing statute is
silent as to whether such rights and remedies shall be abrogated or not."); State v. Dodge City, 470
N.W.2d 795, 797 (Neb. 1991) ("[U]nder the general saving clause, a pending action is not affected by
the repeal or amendment of a statute, and the laws in effect at the time of the commencement of the
action are controlling.").
165. Judicial restraint is defined as "A philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges
avoid indulging their personal beliefs about the public good and instead try merely to interpret the law as
legislated and according to precedent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (7th ed. 1999).
166. The federal general savings statute reads:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any
penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing
Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining
in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the
enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary
statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or
liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so
expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for
the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of
such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
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prevent the "technical abatement" of a pending prosecution.' 67 Over time,
similar to the general saving statutes in use at the state level, the federal
general saving statute has exceeded its original scope and prevented the
retroactive application of ameliorative legislative changes.16 8  While the
courts have maintained this rule, there have been two noteworthy
exceptions which suggest that these courts practice retroactive amelioration
without acknowledging it: the repeal of a constitutional amendment or the
replacing of formerly proscribed conduct with an affirmative right.' 6 9 In
both circumstances, the defendants have been allowed to benefit from the
ameliorative legislative changes despite the federal general saving statute.
a. Constitutional Amendment Exception
When the National Prohibition Act was repealed, there were several
pending prosecutions that the Supreme Court decided to terminate. 170
According to the Court, adherence to the federal general saving statute
would have been inappropriate because it would have broadened the
constitutional authority of Congress' 7 1 to prevent an ameliorative
constitutional change from being given effect. This would permit the
preemption of a constitutional amendment with a legislative statute, thereby
elevating the intent of the legislators over the expressed will of the people.
While the Court may have relied upon a "technical" reason to forgo
adherence to the federal general saving statute, it was engaging in
retroactive amelioration. The Court's action in practice was no different
than those of the state courts that have applied ameliorative changes
retroactively despite a general saving statute. The fact that the ameliorative
change was a constitutional amendment provided the Court with reasons to
deny giving effect to the federal general saving statute and thus allow
retroactive amelioration to take place. Although the Court based its reason
on the idea of a superseding legal authority, the will of the people over
congressional statutory authority, the practical effect is that the Court
engaged in judicial retroactive amelioration. In the other instance, the
1 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
167. See MacKenzie, supra note 29, at 181-82.
168. Id. at 174.
169. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1965) ("[T]he Civil Rights Act
works no such technical abatement. It substitutes a right for a crime. So drastic a change is well beyond
the narrow language of amendment and repeal. It is clear, therefore, that if the convictions were under a
federal statute they would be abated.").
170. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222 (1934).
171. The Court in Chambers stated:
The law here sought to be applied was deprived of force by the people themselves
as the inescapable effect of their repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The
principle involved is thus not archaic, but rather is continuing and vital-that the
people are free to withdraw the authority they have conferred and, when
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Court applied an ameliorative change retroactively by terminating
prosecutions in which the proscribed conduct became an affirmative right.
b. Affirmative Right Exception to the Federal General Saving Statute
The other notable example of the Court giving effect to an
ameliorative change was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 where
the Court recognized an affirmative right exception to the federal general
saving statute. The Court ignored the federal general saving statute and
applied an ameliorative legislative change retroactively to several pending
state prosecutions following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill.172 In Hamm, a consolidation of several sit-in
cases, the Court chose not to adhere to the federal general saving statute
which would have prevented the abatement of the pending prosecutions of
defendants who had violated state trespass laws. 173 The Civil Rights Act of
1964174 effectively outlawed public accommodation discrimination and
"remove[d] peaceful attempts to be served on an equal basis from the
category of punishable activities."175  With the passage of the Act, the
conduct for which the various defendants were prosecuted and convicted
had been decriminalized. Prosecutors argued, however, that the
prosecutions should continue unabated and the prior convictions allowed to
stand based on the federal general saving statute. The Court disagreed,
reasoning that the existing state trespass laws had been supplanted and no
longer existed following the passage of the Civil Rights Act. It held that the
purpose of the federal general saving statute was to prevent technical
abatement,17 6 not amelioration.
The Court reiterated the fundamental premise of the abatement
doctrine that a prosecution could not continue because the governing statute
had been repealed following a legislative changel 77 and in the same breath,
also recognized the principle that a continued prosecution in light of a
change that decriminalizes the conduct may in fact undermine legitimate
goals of punishment, such as deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
172. Hamm, 379 U.S. at 307. The group of defendants in Hamm had been prosecuted for
violating state laws for trespassing following lunch counter sit-ins. In each case, the defendants were
prosecuted and convicted, and the respective state supreme court had affirmed the trial court decisions.
Id. at 307-08.
173. MacKenzie, supra note 29, at 174 ("[Tlhe Court found that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
caused all such nonfinal prosecutions to abate even though the act did not expressly so provide. No
barrier to this decision was found in the federal savings statute, despite the broad interpretation indicated
by prior case law and the clear language of the statute itself.").
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006).
175. Hamm, 379 U.S. at 308.
176. See MacKenzie, supra note 29, at 182 ("[Although the savings provision was not specifically
discussed, the legislative history of the act of 1871 does lend some support to the Court's conclusion in
Hamm that the purpose of the savings statute was to obviate mere technical abatements.").
177. Hamm, 379 U.S. at 313 (1964) (noting that the Civil Rights Act is federal legislation and the
court applies it to the instant cases by using the Supremacy Clause).
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retribution.178  Although the Court relied heavily on principles of the
common-law doctrine of abatement, the language that the Court invoked
reflects the language of retroactive amelioration. For example, the Court
opined that Congress clearly did not mean to prohibit the retroactive
application of the ameliorative changes embodied in the Civil Rights Act. 179
Further, the Court noted that the federal general saving statute was not
meant to prevent the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal
legislation18 0 because it was created specifically to prevent the triggering of
the abatement doctrine following a legislative change in which the penalty
for an offense was increased. Thus, the federal general saving statute was
to prevent a "technical abatement" only.' 8 ' The Court declared that because
it was "so drastic a change," it was beyond the scope of the "narrow
language of amendment and repeal."1 8 2
According to the Court, the magnitude of the change from illegal
conduct to an affirmative right was such that ordinary rules of statutory
construction were inapplicable. Moreover, given the circumstances, the
purpose of the federal general saving statute was not meant to prohibit the
granting of new rights. In short, the Court's reasoning appears to
differentiate its actions from that of its state court counterparts but it does
not. The state courts also rely upon similar reasoning when disregarding
the general saving statutes. Furthermore, the Court's retroactive
amelioration process is even more so like that of its state court counterparts
in that the retroactive application of the ameliorative changes is also
restricted to cases that have not yet reached final judgment.18 3
Other federal courts have consistently held that in the absence of
express language applying an ameliorative change retroactively, the federal
general savings statute is to be enforced and the defendant will not receive
178. Id. at 313-14 ("[T]he principle takes the more general form of imputing to Congress an
intention to avoid inflicting punishment at a time when it can no longer further any legislative purpose,
and would be unnecessarily vindictive.").
179. Id. at310-ll.
180. Id. at 314 ("The federal saving statute was originally enacted in 1871 ... It was meant to
obviate mere technical abatement such as that illustrated by the application of the rule in [United States
v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88 (1871)] decided in 1871.").
181. Id.
182. Id. at 314-15 ("We cannot believe the Congress ... intended the Act to operate less
effectively then the run-of-the-mill repealer. Since the provisions of the Act would abate all federal
prosecutions it follows that the same rule must prevail under the Supremacy Clause which requires that a
contrary state practice or state statute must give way. Here the Act intervened before either of the
judgments under attack was finalized. Just as in federal cases abatement must follow in these state
prosecutions. Rather than a retroactive intrusion into state criminal law this is but the application of a
long-standing federal rule ... that since the Civil Rights Act substitutes a right for a crime any state
statute, or its application, to the contrary must ... give way under the normal abatement rule covering
pending convictions arising out of a pre-enactment activity.").
183. Id. at 313-15 ("Although Chambers specifically left open the question of the effect of its rule
on cases where final judgment was rendered prior to ratification of the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment, and
petition for certiorari sought thereafter, such an extension of the rule was taken for granted in the per
curiam decision in [Massey v. United States, 291 U.S. 608 (1934)]. . . . [T]he Act intervened before
either of the judgments under attack was finalized . . . .").
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the benefits of a newly amended statute.' 84  These courts have explicitly
rejected the state court arguments that have been used to apply ameliorative
changes.' 85  Federal courts have further emphasized that the federal general
savings statute is not an optional rule of statutory construction that need not
be followed,186 a proposition that the Supreme Court has also confirmed.18 7
The failure to give retroactive effect to ameliorative changes, however, has
been challenged on the grounds that a statute's effective date signaled not
only the prospective date in which the application of the amendment was to
take place, but the more important fact that the amendment should also be
given immediate retroactive effect to all pending prosecutions.'" Courts
have, however, disagreed with this characterization, stating that immediate
retroactive effect would not be unjust on equal protection grounds.'89
Although the position of the courts appears undeniable, it has not been fully
foreclosed. These courts have questioned whether it would matter at what
stage a prosecution was in when the ameliorative change was passed.'90
184. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("In 1931, two federal circuit
courts of appeals, including the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
considered that amendment, which substantially reduced the maximum penalties for selling not more
than a gallon of liquor. They held that, in the absence of a provision applying the amendment to
previously committed offenses, the general savings statute applied; the amendment 'had no application
to pending cases."'); see also Hurwitz v. United States, 53 F.2d 552, 552 (1931) (citing Maceo v. United
States, 46 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1931)).
185. Holiday, 683 A.2d at 72 (discussing United States v. Ross, 464 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1972))
("Ross gave short shrift to the proposition that the general savings statute applied only to 'technical
abatement' of an entire prosecution, not to mere sentencing issues. Ross also rejected the contention
that, because § 109 literally applied only to save a 'penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred' under the
repealed statute, the savings statute must apply only to collateral attacks on sentences already imposed.
[T]he court in Ross emphasized the plain language of § 109 that '[t]he repeal of any statute shall not ...
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute,' and concluded that, because
'sentencing is an integral part of the prosecution,' it was 'incurred' (meaning it had accrued) as of a time
when the criminal act was committed, before the new sentencing provisions became effective.")
(citations omitted).
186. See id. at 79-80 ("In applying the general savings statutes we are not dealing with optional
rules of statutory construction. . . . These general statutes . . . cannot be flicked aside as though
legislative intent can, and must, be divined without reference to them.").
187. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908) ("[T]he provisions of [the
savings statute later recodified as I U.S.C. § 109] are to be treated as if incorporated in and as a part of
subsequent enactments, and . . . under .. . general principles of construction requiring . . . that effect be
given to all the parts of a law, the section must be enforced unless, either by express declaration or
necessary implication.").
188. See Holiday, 683 A.2d at 78 ("The only way to conclude ... that the Council 'expressly'
provided for application of the repealer to all pending prosecutions where sentence had not been
imposed (or adjudicated to a final conviction) is to say that there is some kind of objectively discernable
imperative-inherent in adopting ameliorative sentencing legislation-which unambiguously means that
the very reference to an effective date signals effectiveness immediately, including application to
proceedings in pending prosecutions commenced at a time when harsher sentences were anticipated.");
see also People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197, 202 (N.Y. 1956).
189. See Holiday, 683 A.2d 61 at 78-79 ("We cannot say that a legislature could not rationally
conclude that the best approach would be a purely prospective one, so that all defendants who
committed crimes before the statute became effective would be treated equally.").
190. Id. at 71 n.23 ("[N]either Hurwitz's nor Maceo's sentence had been finally adjudicated
before the ameliorative amendment had become effective.. . . [Wle do not decide whether there may be
situations in which the apparently different timelines in Maceo and Hurwitz would produce different
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Hence, the retroactive application of an ameliorative change may be proper
under the right circumstances. With the inconsistency at the state and
federal courts, judicial retroactive amelioration lacks uniformity and is
inconsistent in its application. The legislatures, however, have a better
approach to provide effective retroactive amelioration.
B. Legislative Retroactive Amelioration
The legislatures in a minority of jurisdictions engage in retroactive
amelioration by attaching an ameliorative amendment exceptionl 91 to their
general saving statutes.192 In doing so, the legislature accomplishes the
goals of preventing a defendant from being released from criminal liability
while still applying a less severe penalty. 193  An ameliorative amendment
exception therefore insures not only that the proscribed conduct will be
punished, but also that the punishment is set at a sufficient level to achieve
the goals of punishment. While the current legislative amelioration practice
results in the defendant receiving the benefits of an enlightened legislative
decision to reduce the punishment for an offense, there are limitations.
Presently, the ameliorative amendment exception is given effect if
there is no express saving clause and the prosecution has not become
final. 194 With these limitations, the legislature's recognition that the
original penalty is too harsh and its retention is vindictive is meaningless.
The benefits that are to be received from ameliorative sentencing changes
should therefore not be limited to circumstances where there is neither an
express saving clause nor has the case become final. In restricting
retroactive amelioration with these parameters, the only defendants that are
legal results." (citing Hurwitz v. United States, 53 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1931) and Maceo v. United
States, 46 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1931))).
191. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 214(c) (2007) ("If the penalty or punishment for any
offense is reduced by the amendment of an act or statutory provision, the same shall be imposed in
accordance with the act or provision as amended unless imposed prior to the date of the amendment.").
192. See infra Appendix II. Each ameliorative amendment exception provides for the retroactive
application of such changes. Some, however, such as Illinois, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia,
allow the affected party to select whether the new change should apply.
193. State v. Flagg, 624 A.2d 864, 866-67 (Vt. 1993) ("The purpose of § 214(b)(3) and § 214(c)
is to ensure that an accused is not relieved of liability due to a repeal of a statute, while . . .ensuring that
outdated, harsh penalties are not imposed after the Legislature has deemed them no longer necessary or
appropriate."); see Holiday, 683 A.2d at 70 (discussing W. VA. CODE § 2-2-8 (2009): "The general
savings clause of West Virginia expressly provides for retroactive application of mitigating statutes
enacted before the sentence is pronounced but not for retroactive application thereafter."); see also
People v. Thomas, 525 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (holding that it was error to refuse to
apply a change in the law mitigating penalties).
194. The mitigated penalty will be applied unless the defendant chooses the prior penalty. See
Wall v. State, 18 Tex. 682, 682 (Tex. 1857) ("The penal code provides that no offense committed prior
to the taking effect thereof, shall be affected by the repeal therein, of existing laws, but punishment shall
take place as if the laws repealed had remained in force; except that where the punishment shall have
been mitigated by the code, its provisions shall apply to and control any judgment to be pronounced
after its taking effect, for any offense theretofore committed, unless the defendant elect the former
punishment."); see also Doren, supra note 36, at 1162 (noting that the defendant has choice of
punishments).
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eligible to benefit from such changes are pre-final judgment defendants.
The problem with a temporal division of eligibility is that worthiness of a
reduced sentence is a quirk of circumstance or a manifestation of
ambiguous statutory language and the defendant's additional culpable
conduct. The proposed retroactive amelioration statute removes the
temporal distinction from the application of such changes and expands the
scope of retroactive amelioration equally to the entire of class of
defendants. By doing so, defendants charged with, being prosecuted or
convicted under the same offense will receive the same penalty regardless
of when the conduct occurred but based upon the concept of equity. Critics
of the proposed retroactive amelioration statute will object on a number of
criminal justice grounds. This Article responds to several concerns that
may be offered.
VI. Objections to Proposed Retroactive Amelioration Statute
Opponents to the proposed retroactive amelioration statute will
raise several concerns in support of retaining the current retroactive
amelioration practice. The statute in existence at the time the conduct was
committed, for example, should govem and remain in force. Also, the
process of reevaluating the sentencing not only disturbs final judgments,1 95
but it also undermines the concept of a unified prosecution (i.e. adjudication
and sentencing as one process). Others may propose that the legislature's
decision to change a sentence may be based on considerations wholly
different than mitigation, thus the penalty should not be given retroactive
effect because the legislative motivation for that outcome was not present.
And still others may assert that extending the scope of retroactive
amelioration will place an undue burden on the criminal justice system. 196
In essence, the proposed statute adds an additional stage in the process and
further impacts limited resources. The proposed retroactive amelioration is
conceived in a manner that will have the least impact on the criminal justice
system as a whole and the greatest impact on the individual as discussed
below.
A. "Snapshot" Justice
The first concern is a temporal one and is based upon the premise
that an individual should be punished under the statute in existence at the
time the conduct is committed.' 9 7 This concern focuses on the defendant
but also on the circumstances under which the prior statue may have been
passed. To apply a statute retroactively neither gives the individual fair
notice of the law nor does it respect the decision of the previous legislature
195. See infra. Part VI.B.
196. See infra. Part VIE.
197. United States v. Ross, 464 F.2d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 1972).
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and may contravene the will of the people. This view of criminal conduct
and punishment can be viewed as the snapshot approach, where the event
was committed at a discrete and finite point in time thus requiring the
application of the penalty that existed at that specific point in time.
While the commission of the act may have occurred at a static point
in time, criminal justice and punishment constantly evolve.198 The change
in the penalty reflects a greater knowledge on the part of the legislature
about the relationship between the conduct and the punishment. The
reduction or increase in the punishment is an objective indication that the
previous punishment was either too harsh or too lenient to satisfy the goals
of punishment. Whereas a retroactive increase in punishment is
constitutionally barred, a decrease is not. Denying the retroactive
application of an ameliorative legislative change simply under the snapshot
approach to justice ignores the fundamentally important concept that the
standards of justice should and do evolve.
B. Finality of Judgments Undermined
Another concern likely to be raised is that the proposed retroactive
amelioration statute undermines final judgments. The proposed statue
however does not disturb finalized convictions. The proposed statute does
not require that defendant seek relief in the courts. The statute provides a
post-final judgment process that allows convicted defendants to receive the
same benefits of ameliorative sentencing changes as pre-final judgment
defendants are likely to receive. Because the retroactive amelioration
process is under the control of the executive branch, the courts have no role
in the processing of sentencing readjustments or potential sentencing
hearings which can be adjudicated by an administrative law judge. The
process of assessing whether a defendant is eligible requires an evaluation
of the new statute using the amelioration typology.
The failure to expand the scope of amelioration statute does
however lead to problems of equity as it encourages potential abuse or
inconsistent application. For example, a defendant who followed the rules,
such as appearing for hearings, was convicted under a statute, while another
defendant who had fled the jurisdiction was allowed to receive the
ameliorative benefits following a legislative change. 199 While the latter
may have been more culpable and blameworthy, the former was denied the
ameliorative benefits. The sentencing readjustment would occur after the
defendant who has been convicted has been transferred to the department of
corrections and thus no longer the responsibility of the court, depending on
that jurisdiction's determination of what constitutes final judgment. Apart
from the concern that such a process interferes with finality, another
198. See P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972) ("[A]s a general rule, the punishment for
an offense is governed by the law in effect at the time the offense is committed.").
199. See Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971).
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concern is that it will undefined the concept of the unitary prosecution.
C. Undermining the Concept of a Unitary Prosecution
Interference with the "unitary criminal prosecution" 20 0 is a concern.
Under the current practice of retroactive amelioration, the prosecution
process-namely, adjudication and sentencing-is left undisturbed. Critics
may argue that a prosecution is incomplete without both the adjudication
and sentencing phases, and the concept of giving retroactive effect to an
ameliorative change separates the two. 2 0 1  While this argument may be
theoretically correct, it is not correct in practice.
The sentencing process is already bifurcated in capital trials.202 The
response is that capital punishment is different and that this division of
adjudication and sentencing is unique to this particular punishment. The
sentencing process, while a part of a trial, is by all accounts distinct from
the adjudication of guilt. During the sentencing phase, for example, there is
a lower level of proof for the admission of evidence.2 03 Moreover, there are
additional actors for the State that have no other role except to conduct a
pre-sentence investigation and create a profile of the defendant. With these
minor differences, the notion of a unitary prosecution is in name only.
Sentencing as a practice therefore is treated fundamentally differently from
the adjudication phase. Furthermore, a defendant's sentence is revisited and
reviewed by a number of different entities at various stages, such as
collateral review, parole boards, and the power of the executive to pardon.
Finally, critics may suggest that that an ameliorative change may not have
been prompted by a legislative concern for the harshness of a penalty but
for other reasons.
200. State v. Reis, 165 P.3d 980, 988 (Haw. 2007)
201. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("In construing the savings
clause-'Prosecutions for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of [the Act] shall not
be affected by the repeals or amendments made by [it] ... or abated by reason thereof-the Court
confirmed in [Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605 (1973)] that sentencing is part of the prosecution;
the sentence is not part of a subsequent, severable proceeding.").
202. See Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 80 n.72 (2004) (noting that
American death penalty jurisdictions typically provide for separate guilt and penalty trials in capital
cases).
203. During the adjudication phase, the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt, but the threshold is
lower with respect to sentencing. See Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime
Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European Law,
33 VT. L. REv. 435, 439 n.38 (2009) (discussing the preponderance of the evidence standard at
sentencing hearings); Note, The Due Process Roots of Criminal Collateral Estoppel, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1729, 1745 n.95 (1996); see also United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing clear
and convincing standard at sentencing hearings); Scott M. Brennan, Due Process Comes Due: An
Argument for the Clear and Convincing Evidentiary Standard in Sentencing Hearings, 77 IOWA L. REV.
1803, 1819 (1992).
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D. Amendment Reasons May Be Wholly Unrelated to Amelioration
The legislature's decision to amend a statute and reduce a penalty
may have been motivated by reasons wholly unrelated to a desire to
mitigate the penalty. For some jurisdictions, the decision may be based
upon fiscal concerns or due to overcrowding. As a result, the legislative
decision to change a penalty may be focused on addressing these issues.
Regardless of motivating factor, the legislature has linked those practical
concerns with goals of punishment. The legislature may not desire to
ameliorate the punishment, but its decision to reduce the punishment
reflects an assessment that the offender no longer needs to be punished as
long. On the other hand, the decision to ameliorate may be in reaction to
prior legislative changes that occurred in response to perceived criminal
justice epidemics.
Responding to the public, legislators may have engaged in law-
making merely to appease their constituents. For instance, the disparity2 04
between crack and powder cocaine sentencing is a prime example.
[P]artly by design, more by default, and in response to pressures
on legislators who are expected to initiate action to do something
about the crime problem, we continue to pass criminal laws with
drunken abandon as if the laws themselves had a sacrosanct or
charismatic quality. Further, the passage of laws is too often
done without asking whether or not it is reasonable to assume
that the behavior can be effectively controlled by the system of
-205
criminal justice.
After time, however, the effect of the changes can be analyzed and adjusted
accordingly, as in sentencing disparities between crack cocaine and powder
cocaine. The reasoning also operates in the other direction. A legislature
may respond to the fact that an earlier body made the penalties too lenient
and subsequently increases. While the legislature is constitutionally barred
from applying the newly increased punishment retroactively, it does not
mean that the change cannot occur. The retroactive amelioration statute
reflects society's new assessment of what is an appropriate punishment.
And while the constitutional prohibition exists to prevent the tyranny of the
state, there is no need to prevent the benevolence of the state. Lastly, the
proposed statute has the potential to be burdensome for the criminal justice
system.
204. See infra. notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
205. GRUPP, supra note 35, at 4.
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E. Undue Burden on Criminal Justice System
The final argument against the proposed retroactive amelioration
statute is that the retroactive application of ameliorative changes will be
burdensome to the criminal justice system,206 further straining limited
resources. Critics might claim that the system will face challenges in
providing a post-final judgment amelioration process. Inconvenience,
207however, should not serve as a barrier to achieving justice.
In 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission reduced the
advisory sentence for crack cocaine under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in an attempt to address the sentencing disparity between crack
and powder cocaine.20 8 The obvious question then arose as to how to
handle those individuals that had already been sentenced. It was estimated
that over nineteen thousand federal prisoners would be affected by the
change. 2 0 9 After acknowledging the sentencing disparity, the Commission
held that it would be unjust to allow sentenced prisoners to remain
incarcerated under their original sentences. 2 10  Thus, the Sentencing
Commission was faced with the challenge of remedying this past inequity
and did so by calling for the gradual release of crack cocaine offenders, as
determined by federal sentencing courts. The retroactive amelioration
statute would present similarly manageable challenges.
Pre-final judgment defendants would have ameliorative changes
applied as they currently do, so the increased administrative burdens to that
class of defendants would be minimal. The difference would be that rather
than have the court assess whether an ameliorative change had occurred, the
206. Vicory v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ind. 1980) ("[A]s a practical matter, a legislature
would not likely want to burden the courts with massive sentence reviews.").
207. See Metter, supra note 22, at 244 ("If equal protection may be denied on the grounds of
administrative convenience, the guarantee of equal protection of the law becomes fictional.").
208. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 706 (2007). The Supreme Court has
also recognized this sentencing disparity. See Spears v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 840, 844 (2009)
(holding that district courts are entitled to vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on
policy disagreements about the sentencing disparity rather than individual determinations); Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (holding that a drug trafficker dealing in crack cocaine is
subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100 times as much powder cocaine and that a district
judge may consider this disparity when finding a sentence within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
unreasonable).
209. See Press Release, U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Urges Congress to Pass Legislation
Reducing Crack Cocaine Sentencing Disparity (Apr. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/2009/SentencingDisparity.cfm (stating that the courts
"managed ably" in reviewing over 19,000 motions for sentencing modification following the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's 2007 amendment).
210. The Commission decided to apply the 2007 amendment retroactively. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 11B1.10 cmt. (2008); see also Press Release, United States Sentencing
Commission, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for
Crack Cocaine Offenses (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rell21107.htm
(noting that the decision to apply the amendment retroactively will not apply to every crack cocaine
offender and that it will be up to federal sentencing courts to determine whether and by how much each
offender's sentence should be lowered).
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legislature would have already made that predetermination.211 The
difficulty would rest largely with post-final judgment defendants. The
process would be relegated to an administrative body that would be notified
by the legislature that a penalty for an offense had been ameliorated. The
administrative sentencing board would be responsible for noting the change
and providing notice of the change to the defendant. If, however, the board
failed to do so or did not apply the change, then the defendant could seek a
sentencing review hearing to petition to have the ameliorative change
applied. The impact of the existing cases could be handled by having
existing parole boards adopt the responsibility as a part of their existing
duties.
VII. Conclusion
The proposed retroactive amelioration statute provides a
mechanism for post-final judgment defendants to have ameliorative
legislative changes applied to them. Currently, retroactive amelioration is
either denied outright or limited to circumstances where the legislature has
not included an express saving class and final judgment has not been
attained. As a result, ameliorative legislative changes are limited to pre-
final judgment defendants whose cases are still pending when the
legislature amends a statute. The restriction of ameliorative changes in this
manner is based not upon the degree of culpability but temporality. To
deny the application of change based upon such an arbitrary distinction
offends the theories of punishment whether one is a consequentialist or
retributivist.
The proposed statute builds upon the existing saving clause
framework which was created to prevent the unintended and premature
termination of pending prosecutions following any legislative change.
Using the general saving statute along with an ameliorative amendment
exception as a framework and adding a post-final judgment provision, the
proposed retroactive amelioration statute seeks to make the application of
retroactive amelioration uniform not only within but also across
jurisdictions. In denying an ameliorative legislative change, jurisdictions
are engaging in vindictive justice, and that is manifestly unjust.
211. There may be challenges as to whether a change should be designated as ameliorative, but
according to the amelioration typology, see supra Part 1II.A and the definitions set forth in the Proposed
Statute, infra Appendix I, that should be easy to ascertain.
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Appendix I-Proposed Retroactive Amelioration Statute
Retroactive Amelioration Statute Purpose: THE PURPOSE OF THIS
STATUTE IS: (1) to increase the intra-jurisdictional uniformity with respect
to legislative changes by providing clear definitions when a legislative
repeal, repeal and reenactment or amendment of a statute constitutes an
ameliorative change; and (2) to expand the scope of applying ameliorative
changes to individual whose convictions have become finalized and no
longer have any judicial recourse.
§ 1. Definitions
(a) Amelioration:
(i) Decriminalization of Conduct. The reduction of a sentence
through either:
(A) The unqualified repeal of a statute; or
(B) The change of an offense from a designation of criminal to
civil; or
(C) The replacing of criminal offense with an affirmative right.
(ii) Reclassification of Conduct. The reclassification of conduct is
the legislative categorization of an offense into different degrees or classes.
Example: The change of a felony from a Class A to a Class B; or from a
felony to misdemeanor; or
(iii) Reduction of Sentence. The reduction of the sentence is when
the penalty is lessened without repeal or reclassification. The rule of thumb
is that whenever the lower boundary, the minimum, is decreased, then the
change will be considered ameliorative. Example: Assume that a statue has
the following penalty: a minimum of five years and a maximum of ten
years. Whenever the minimum is changed to a sentence that is less than
five years then that will constitute an ameliorative legislative change.
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(iv) The following are examples of when an ameliorative change
has occurred:
(A) the minimum is decreased and the maximum remains
unchanged; or
(B) the minimum is decreased and the maximum is increased; or,
(C) both the maximum and the minimum are decreased.
(v) The following are examples of when an ameliorative change has
not occurred:
(A) the minimum is increased while the maximum remains
unchanged; or
(B) the maximum is increased while the minimum remains the
same; or
(C) both the minimum and the maximum are increased; or the
minimum is increased and the maximum is decreased.
(b) Amelioration Clause. An amelioration clause is a statutory provision
that allows an ameliorative change to be applied retroactively.
(c) General Saving Clause. A general saving clause preserves rights and
liabilities which have accrued under a repealed act.
(d) Retroactive (or retrospective). Extending in scope or effect to matters
that have occurred in the past.
(e) Unqualified Repeal. The unqualified repeal of a statute operates to
deprive a party of all such rights that have not been reduced to final
judgment
§ 2. General Saving Clause. The repeal of any statute shall not have the
effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred
under such statute, unless provided for elsewhere in this Act, and such
statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of
sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such
penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall
not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or
liability incurred under such statute, unless provided for elsewhere in this
Act, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the
purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement
of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability unless provided for in this Act.
§ 3. Amelioration Clause. If the penalty or punishment for any offense is
reduced by the amendment of an act or statutory provision, the same shall
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be imposed in accordance with the act or provision as amended and shall be
applied to defendants whose cases have not become final and to defendants
who have finalized convictions in accordance with the provisions set forth
below.
(a) Pre-Final Judgment Application
(i) Ameliorative legislative changes will be applied retroactively:
(A) in the absence of an express saving clause; and
(B) if the defendant's case has not reached final judgment.
(ii) if the case has become final, then the provisions of 3(b) will
become effective
(b) Post-Final Judgment Application
(i) Ameliorative legislative changes will be applied retroactively
when the penalty for an offense has been mitigated. The ameliorative
change will be applied by an Administrative Sentencing Board ("ASB").
(ii) If the ASB fails to give retroactive effect to the ameliorative
sentencing change, then the defendant can petition to have the sentence
reviewed at a Sentence Readjustment Hearing ("SRH").
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Appendix 11-Saving Provisions
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